A recent blog post by Cristina Archetti argued that online radicalisation is getting too much attention relative to other factors behind jihadist terror plots.

I agree with that, and this post present some of my own thoughts on online radicalisation (some pulled from earlier writings), and I would like to hear recommendations of further research sources from the readers.

Public discussion of online radicalisation

To argue that the role of the internet in violent extremism has been exaggerated, Archetti used the example of the jihadists recently convicted of planning a bombing attack in the UK.  She argued that the British media focused overwhelmingly on the plotter’s use of extremist material like Inspire magazine, as if it had a greater radicalising influence than their offline activity (which included training trips to Pakistan). This approach assumes “that stumbling on Al Qaeda cleric’s online sermon (or even consuming that material over time) will turn an ordinary individual into a radical bent on the mass slaughter of fellow citizens.”

Her argument counters a good deal of public discussion on the jihadist threat, including in Australia. In 2011 an Australian security specialist called for banning online extremist material, arguing that “the growing risks of internet radicalisation, especially among vulnerable youth in the West, now outweigh both the argument of security agencies in favour of monitoring online material for intelligence purposes, and the civil libertarian argument concerning free speech.”

So, is Archetti correct? Has the internet’s role been overhyped in discussions of jihadism?

Existing research

Plenty of current scholarship supports Archetti’s point. Tens of thousands of people might view online extremist material but only a very small number of them engage in violence. It’s necessary to identify what differentiates the violent few.

One large-scale research project by the UK think-tank Demos, which interviewed terrorists and compared them with non-violent control groups, found that members of the control groups had also often viewed online extremist material. The difference was that the violent ones were more likely to have shared the material with each other and discussed it as a group, showing the importance of social dynamics in radicalisation.

This can be combined with other research to show that if the group in question has access to training camps and conflict zones or includes people with previous jihadist involvement, they are far more likely to turn to violence than the many other people who view online extremist material.

For example, a recent UK Home Office report found that “the internet does not appear to play a significant role” in jihadist radicalization compared to “personal attachments to radicalizing agents.” Recent research by Thomas Hegghammer found that 46% of all jihadist plots in the West between 1990 and 2010 included a “foreign fighter”, someone who had trained or fought with a jihadist movement overseas.

While this does mean that 54% of plots occurred without the involvement of someone with overseas jihadist experience, those plots were less likely to be effective. Similarly, Anne Sternersen and Petter Nesser have shown that jihadists have not been able to acquire valuable terrorist skills through the internet. Gaining effective skills for violence usually requires physical travel.

None of the above suggests that the internet doesn’t play a role, simply that additional factors are usually needed for people to turn from online activity to terrorist plots.

Australian examples

This has particularly been the case in Australia. While Hegghammer found that 46% of jihadist plots in the West involved a foreign fighter, his data indicates that 100% of Australian plots did.

Furthermore, in Australia’s four major plots the jihadists do not appear to have first met each other online, communicated extensively online, or partaken in technologically sophisticated plots. While the publically available information on some of these plots is limited, the evidence so far suggests the internet has been less important for jihadist radicalisation in Australia than real-world social networks that include people with experience in (or access to) camps and conflict zones.

For example, the Pendennis plotters’ certainly downloaded extensive extremist material (including instructional material), and were particularly enamoured with the works of Abu Musab al-Suri. But they were also part of tight-knit like-minded groups which included multiple members had trained in al-Qa`ida and LeT camps, and had a self-taught religious leader providing a theological basis for violence in Australia. This makes it doubtful that the internet was the decisive factor behind their radicalisation.

Where to now?

If the internet’s role in jihadist radicalisation is so often overhyped, where should we turn for reliable information on what actual role it plays?

Aaron Zelin’s report on The State of Global Jihad Online is very valuable, and Peter Neumann’s Countering Online Radicalization in America looks promising but I haven’t read it yet.

Beyond those, I can’t think of other examples. I’m also conscious that there may be compelling scholarship that I’m unaware of arguing that online radicalisation is a major factor. After all, on some rare occasions individuals have radicalised online by themselves, as seen with Jihad Jane or Roshonara Choudhry.

So, readers, what further sources would recommend? Please let me know in the comments or on Twitter.

Update 1:

On Thursday, Extremis Project published a post titled Al-Qaeda’s Cyber Warfare: The Virtual World of Extremism, which provides a good example of the viewpoint I am arguing against: “The recent case of the 3 men convicted of terrorism offences in Birmingham highlights how easily people can be radicalised through the Internet by websites and online videos/sermons.”

Anne Sternerson has a new journal article out titled ‘Bomb-making for Beginners’:Inside an Al-Qaeda E-Learning Course. It builds on the her 2008 article which I cited above:

“An article published in 2008 argued that while there is an abundance of training literature on radical forums online, the Internet does not function as a “virtual training camp” for Al-Qaeda – mainly, because there is no organized effort on part of Al-Qaeda Central to train people online. Others have argued that Internet training would never really replace real-life training because the Internet training can only transfer implicit but not tacit knowledge, i.e. the skills that can only come from hands-on experience.[13]

 

This paper argues that Al-Qaeda Central is still not making a determined effort to train followers online. However, online training courses organized by “jihobbyists” and forum administrators have become somewhat more professionalized over the past three years.”

 

Also, in the comments below Ramananda Sengupta provided the following links:

http://www.isodarco.it/courses/andalo12/doc/Zarqawi%20to%20Awlaki_V2.pdf

http://www.thecommentator.com/article/1337/uk_couple_radicalised_online_accused_of_planning_to_attack_jewish_targets

http://www.strategicdialogue.org/StockholmPPN2011_BackgroundPaper_FOR%20WEBSITE.pdf

Australia’s far-right scene usually gets little media attention. Radical political movements often struggle to be noticed in the media, and that’s probably a good thing. However, it creates a discrepancy in reporting when violence is concerned.

If a far-right extremist is prosecuted for a violent crime, the arrest, verdict and sentencing are usually reported, but journalists will rarely provide day-by-day reports of the trials, interview people involved, or push to get suppression orders lifted.

This contrasts with reporting of Australia’s jihadist scene, which generates much more sustained and detailed coverage. This is partly justified because jihadism has posed a much greater threat of mass casualty violence against Australians this century, but even so the prospect of far-right extremist violence is under-acknowledged in public discussion.

For this reason it was interesting to see three news stories in the last week relevant to anyone interested in Australia’s far-right fringe. This post summarises these stories and provides background information.

Plans for Wilders’ visit

Yesterday the Sydney Morning Herald reported that far-right radicals are urging “patriots” to rally in support of Dutch MP Geert Wilders, who is touring Australia as part of his campaign against Islam. It’s unclear if they will manage a better turnout than the anti-climactic rally at the Melbourne State Library in September.

Also, a Slackbastard post shows some division on Australia’s far-right about Wilders’ impending visit. One activist, Welf Herfurth, called for rallies in support of Wilders, but then retracted it because Wilders is a Zionist.

This table helps explain some of these tensions in far-right circles. In short, neo-Nazis and white nationalists worry that a primarily anti-Muslim focus will dilute their message against Jews and non-whites generally.

A 2007 interview with Jim Saleam makes this case here. He complained about “so-called Australian patriots who are using the awareness of Islam to posit a pro-American foreign policy, which includes support for Israel” and that “Australia runs the risk of Asianization not Islamicization.”

Saleam is a leading figure in Australia’s small far-right scene. He is a white nationalist who was involved with neo-Nazism in the 1970s and has an extensive criminal history. He currently leads the Australia First Party, which recently won a seat in Penrith Council.

Slackbastard also states that another far-right group, the Australian Protectionist Party, has fallen apart. Its largest branch has disbanded and wants to reform itself using Wilders’ Freedom Party as a model. In my table I grouped the Australia First Party and the Australian Protectionist party together as white nationalists, but it is a broad category and there are significant differences between the groups. The Australia First Party leans closer to neo-Nazism than the Australian Protectionist Party ever did. For example, unlike the AFP, the APP does not cast “Jewish bankers” as an enemy.

Key APP members might now be trying to move further away from these circles and form a primarily anti-Muslim party, which would have a greater chance of achieving popular support. However, the Rise Up Australia Party is better positioned to capitalise on anti-Muslim sentiment.

Neo-Nazi being sentenced over guns and bombs

A Victorian County Court is currently sentencing a former soldier on weapons and explosives charges. He had described himself as a neo-Nazi, possessed white supremacist material, and had made notes expressing intentions to kill various people such as his former teacher.

The 23-year-old man had four guns, a silencer, bullets, a baton, a home-made knife and knuckle-duster. He had also made pipe-bombs and filmed himself testing explosives. He was described as delusional and paranoid, but very smart, with an IQ of 120.

He was not charged with terrorism offences, but with other offences such as “making improvised explosive devices for an unlawful purpose, causing an explosion likely to endanger life or cause serious injury to property and a variety of offences related to manufacturing and possessing weapons.”

Violent skinhead appeals sentence

On 31 January the Herald Sun reported that neo-Nazi skinhead Shannon Hudson has lodged an appeal against his sentence for bashing a Vietnamese student.

Shannon Hudson, along with another Victorian neo-Nazi, Wayne O’Brien, had been sentenced on 12 December 2012 for the unprovoked attack. The two men were part of a skinhead group that called themselves Crazy Whiteboys. The judge described their commitment to neo-Nazism as superficial, as more of a style than an ideology: “”I am of the view that a lot of your discussions and talk about skinheads and white supremacy, and your Heil Hitler signs, were not really understood by either of you.”

You can read the sentencing document here, listen to a segment of the sentencing here, or listen to the whole thing here. A third person was involved in the bashing, but he was dealt with by the Children’s Court and no information is available on his case.

Unlike O’Brien, Hudson had an extensive criminal history and refused to cooperate with the police, so his appeal is unlikely to be successful.

This final post in the series looks at what the events of 2012 tell us about the current state of Australian jihadism.

The first post showed that, before 2012, Australia had a small, interlinked, closely-monitored, and low-tech jihadist scene. Australian jihadists tended to be young men of somewhat-similar backgrounds to other jihadists throughout the West, though more likely to have low educational qualifications and be of Lebanese background. This jihadist scene manifested itself in four major plots (in 2000, 2003, 2005 and 2009), many attempts to train or fight in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and later Lebanon, Somalia and to lesser extent Yemen. Their activities were externally-guided at first but after 2003 were self-starting. This jihadist scene was apparently declining, as the amount of activity occurring in 2010-2011 was quite small compared to 2003-2005 (a period which saw arrests of members of the LeT cell, the two Pendennis cells, and figures like Belal Khazaal).

The second post showed that while Australia experienced no attempted domestic attacks in 2012, there were various extremist activities related to jihadism, including involvement in the Syria conflict, communal violence relating to that conflict, a violent protest in Sydney over an anti-Muslim film, and a Melbourne man being charged under anti-terrorism legislation.

This post examines what the events of 2012 tell us about the evolution of Australian jihadism.

First impressions

Overall, 2012 did not present many dramatic changes. Several of the earlier points about Australia’s jihadist scene being small and closely monitored still stand. Judging by the limited information available, the demographic characteristics of people involved remain similar.

Nothing emerged in 2012 that contradicted the point that online radicalisation has not been a major feature of Australian jihadism. Australian jihadists and extremists use Facebook and Youtube, just as everyone else does, but there’s little evidence of them meeting online or primarily radicalising online. I keep expecting something to come out that and contradict that, as there’s no reason why Jihad Jane or Roshonara Choudhry (where an individuals’ radicalisation occurred almost entirely online) type incidents can’t happen in Australia.

However, so far that has not happened. Instead, face-to-face radicalisation remains very important. This is noteworthy but not particularly surprising, as several scholars argue that the internet’s role has been overhyped in discussions of terrorism.

One thing I did not expect the Sydney protest, as earlier incidents like the Danish Mohamed cartoons did not lead to violent protests in Australia. Noted earlier, the violence was not an example of jihadism in itself but demonstrated a small and discontented extremist subculture, which has the potential to feed into the other cases of extremism and alleged jihadism, particularly given the highly interlinked nature of Australia’s jihadist scene.

Still interlinked

That was one thing that remained consistent in 2012. There was plenty of overlap between the individuals and institutions (such as bookshops) that appear in reports of people travelling to Syria, the recent protest in Sydney, communal violence here resulting from the Syria conflict, and earlier jihadist incidents in Australia. Terrorism analysts stated that they saw many familiar faces in the Sydney protests, including people connected to the Sydney Pendennis plot, but also people who had been associated with extremist activity going back to the 2000 Olympics.

My own observations of publically available material found that sometimes the connections were extensive. For example, one of the arrested protesters, Ahmed Elomar is the nephew of convicted terrorist Mohamed Ali Elomar, who was the leader of the Sydney Pendennis cell arrested in Operation Pendennis in 2005. Another of Ahmed Elomar’s uncles was convicted of terrorism offences in Lebanon, but details are murky. Ahmed Elomar also knew Sydney Pendennis cell member Khaled Sharrouf, the two were accused of a violent incident in 2011. Ahmed Elomar himself was briefly detained in Lebanon in 2007, suspected of supporting Fatah al-Islam, and possibly tortured. After this 2007 detention in Lebanon, Ahmed’s father accused Sheikh Feiz of “brainwashing” his son. Several of the protesters were reported to be followers of Feiz, though he did condemn the violence and there is no evidence that he played any role in it.

When involved in Sydney riots, Elomar was on bail for charges he faced for an attack on a Shia-owned juicestore, allegedly undertaken by several men from al-Risalah Islamic bookstore (Elomar has now been convicted for this, I’m unaware if others have been). The bookstore’s Sheikh is Belal Khazaal, currently imprisoned for terrorist offences. Members of the al-Risalah crowd have not only been charged and convicted for anti-Shia violence and involvement in the riots, but also for whipping a young convert with an electrical cord in the name of Sharia (though this may have also been a dispute over money).

Another radical, but non-terrorist, connection is that one protester was Ibrahim Galiel, partner of Carnita Matthews. Carnita Matthews is the person who falsely accused a police officer of removing her niqab last year. There was a ruckus outside the courtroom at the time, again reportedly involving students of Sheik Feiz Mohammed again. They called themselves “Islamic Brotherhood Worldwide” but there’s probably no organisation by that name, it was just a slogan on their hoodies. Similarly the “Sixth Pillar” T-shirts worn by many of the protestors do not indicate that there’s an organisation by that name. It was later reported that it was “likely to be individuals who quickly grouped together in the days before the protest to print T-shirts”.

This interconnectedness is very common. Whenever a jihadism-related event occurs in Australia, a quick bit of searching reveals connections to earlier groups and activities. This was similarly the case with the al-Furqan centre in Melbourne, which was raided in September. Its founder had social links with the leader of the Melbourne Pendennis cell, and the centre was behind protests against the Global Atheist Convention in Melbourne during April 2012. The al-Furqan centre was not involved in the Sydney riots, but expressed solidarity with rioters.

So Australia’s jihadist scene, and the broader extremist subculture, remains highly interlinked. As stated in Part I, this makes Australia’s jihadist scene very similar to the UK’s, but different to US’s, where plots are often self-contained (see pages 420 and 422 of this article).

Do these links actually tell us anything?

Of course, when it comes to writing anything about terrorism, it’s very easy to talk of “links”, but harder to assess what importance they actually have. In terms of the sort of links we saw in 2012, I’d draw the following three conclusions.

First, these interconnections are actually a positive sign. That the same groups and individuals keep popping up, again and again, is yet more proof that we are not seeing some sort of widespread spontaneous Muslim rage but a small and persistent extremist fringe.

Second, because of these links, various events will continue to have an impact well beyond those directly involved in any one incident. As Tony Sheehan from the Attorney-General’s Department noted “protests such as the one in Sydney have the potential to intensify existing tensions, particularly when combined with the localised violence in Sydney and Melbourne resulting from issues such as the conflict in Syria.”

Third, the nature of the connections seems to have changed. Earlier this century, several different jihadist networks in Australia could be linked to a few central figures. This was sometimes through operational links (joint involvement in criminal activity) or social links (family, friendship or religious teacher-student relationship). This seems to be far less the case now.

Some of these central figures have simply been arrested and imprisoned, such as Belal Khazaal, and Abdul Nacer Benbrika. However some other figures like Sheikh Feiz, who did not have operational involvement but did have social links to many different networks, simply seem to be just much less relevant to Australia’s jihadist scene than they were ten years ago.

With the old central figures playing a lesser role, it’s possible that there are new central figures that are simply more underground. However, I suspect that Australia’s jihadist scene is instead becoming more diffuse. Keep in mind the point made at the start of Part II about the limited nature of the information currently available.

Syria: the biggest change

The most important development in 2012 was Australian involvement in the Syria conflict.

Since the previous post, another Australian was killed in Syria. This made for a total of four reported Australian deaths in the conflict (one two three four). Three of these deaths have been confirmed, though there roles have not been). There was then a fifth report of an Australian death (see here, para beginning with “overseas news footage”), but this one seems very doubtful.

2013 will likely see further Australian involvement in Syria, in some cases with jihadist groups. This is significant because the Syria conflict has been described as “al-Qaeda’s last great hope.” Clint Watts writes that:

While most eyes have shifted to study AQAP in Yemen, Syria’s protracted civil war may breathe some life into al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda cites lessons learned from the failure of past fighting against the Syrian regime. Al-Qaeda has an established operational safe haven in Western Iraq through which to funnel fighters and ally with Sunni tribesmen in sectarian battles against the Shia majority government in Baghdad. Additionally, Syria’s proximate location to Israel provides a parallel jihadi cause for which al-Qaeda can pursue an enduring agenda beyond the Assad regime. However, a Muslim Brotherhood-backed parallel resistance force might likely outpace a Syrian Al-Qaeda front. Only time and good analysis will provide clarity on a poorly understood Syrian rebel landscape.

For these reasons, Syria has new-found importance to the global jihadist movement. Aaron Zelin’s research indicates that there have been between 1600 and 3600 foreign fighters in the conflict, although not all are involved at the moment. The Australian jihadist scene’s interlinked nature and connections to Lebanon mean that it will be particularly affected by events in Syria. To repeat some key points from the previous post:

The Syrian war is particularly significant because Australia’s jihadist plots have involved connections to overseas conflict zones, whether the attacks were guided by an overseas group or involved people who wanted to join such groups but couldn’t. Moral outrage generated by the massacres of Muslims by a nominally secular regime could help draw new people into the jihadist scene, coupled with the fact that many Australians have a personal connection to the region and may travel to support their friends, families and communities but then become involved with the most extreme groups. The conflict also provides opportunities for aspiring jihadists to gain experience, contacts and deadly skills.

The insurgency is not contained solely within Syria. For example, Jordanian authorities recently uncovered an alleged terror plot by al-Qaeda in Iraq-linked jihadists who had gained weapons and expertise from taking part in the Syrian insurgency. The conflict may feed into existing Australia-Lebanon jihadist connections (such as with the groups Fatah al-Islam and Asbat al-Ansar) which are deeply tied to the northern Lebanese town of Tripoli. Ambassador for Counter-Terrorism Bill Paterson recently noted that “northern Lebanese jihadists are increasingly active in Syria, where they are likely to be working with elements of AQ in Iraq, under the banner of Jabhat al Nusra. We cannot exclude the possibility that some Australian-Lebanese dual nationals or other Australians may be among these.” Of all the events in 2012 the Syria conflict the most potential to spur jihadist radicalisation and is worth watching closely.

 

Where do we stand?

At the end of 2012, we can identify some changes. Earlier, aspiring Australian jihadists travelled to Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia and possibly Yemen. Now the available information suggests they are travelling to Syria (often through Lebanon). We have not seen a major jihadist terror plot since 2009, but in 2012 we did see a range of extremist activities related to jihadism, including involvement in the Syria conflict, related communal violence, the Sydney protest and the al-Furqan raids.

I described Australian jihadism in Part I as “apparently declining”. However, in 2012 there was an unexpected uptick in cases of extremism and alleged jihadism compared to 2010 and 2011.

It no longer appears that Australian jihadism is declining. It is quite possible that considerable jihadist activity was occurring during 2010 and 2011, but it rarely made the news because security agencies simply monitored or chose to disrupt suspected activity rather than lay charges.

However, it does not follow that Australian jihadist activity is rising. Risa Brooks has shown how US analysts drew poorly-founded conclusions from a perceived spike in US jihadism in 2009. Clint Watts has written several posts on the problems of identifying trends in year-by-year measurements of low-frequency events like jihadist plots.

My view is while Australian jihadism is definitely at a lower level than during 2003-2005, it remains persistent and the Syria conflict in particular has created the potential for growth.

We will have to wait and see the impact the events in Syria have. Overall, we are still dealing with a very small, low-tech, interlinked and closely-monitored (though possibly more diffuse) extremist fringe. 2012 has simply delivered a few new angles to watch.

Update 1: On 13 June 2013 I updated some of the information on the Sydney riots.

Update 2: On 2 July 2013 I further updated some of the information on the Sydney riots.

Following from the previous post which covered Australian jihadism before 2012, this one examines the country’s key jihadism-related events during 2012.

This post will unavoidably be full of “alleged” and “reportedly”. The best terrorism research  tends to come years after any event. Media sources can be unreliable, and more solid information often only comes out when journalists and academics are able to interview people involved (terrorists, their families, victims, investigators, affected community members etc), or when people slowly dig through the court documents which sometimes take years to be released.

For example, after the Melbourne and Sydney Pendennis cells were arrested in 2005, the nature of the links between them could not be discussed in the media for six years (even though it was possible to piece a lot of the information through public sources beforehand). In late 2011 the suppression orders were finally lifted and the cells’ interaction could be reported and some particularly valuable court documents became public. To this day, there is very little court material available on the 2009 Holsworthy plot. So researchers examining current events should be very aware of the limited and fragmentary nature of the information available, and always revisit their findings when new information comes out (as argued in this presentation on mistakes made by Middle East analysts).

With that in mind, this post runs through current information available Australia’s key jihadism-related events for 2012, and the next one will discuss what these events tell us about the evolution of Australian jihadism.

Lebanon conviction

In February a Jordanian-Australian man who had been arrested in Lebanon because of alleged jihadism-related activity was convicted, though it is unclear what he was specifically convicted of. By my count he was the sixteenth Australian to be either arrested by Lebanese authorities, or charged in absentia, over alleged jihadist activity.

Siddiq-Conlon arrest

In March, Ibrahim Siddiq-Conlon, the leader of Shariah4Australia, was arrested. Siddiq-Conlon is essentially Australia’s less successful version of the UK’s Anjem Choudary.  He was charged with child porn offences and with making a hoax threat. He later pleaded guilty and was sentenced to time served. While Siddiq-Conlon’s actions are not specifically an example of jihadism, this incident is valuable for demonstrating the poor fortunes of Australia’s Muslim extremist fringe. Similarly, Hizb ut-Tahrir Australia does not compare well to its UK cousin.

Inspire magazine

In May, Australia appeared in a copy of Inspire, the magazine produced by al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. The issue (number 9) provided instructions on how to start bushfires, and mentioned Australia (among several other countries) as both as a target and as an example of the damage bushfires have caused. I argued that this was an unlikely scenario, as jihadists tend to stick to bombings and shootings. This was the second time Australia had appeared in Inspire, the first was simply when a picture of the Opera House appeared in July 2011.

New York guilty plea

In June, a dual US-Australian citizen, pleaded guilty in a New York court of providing material support to al-Qaeda. I considered this the first solid confirmation of Australia-Yemen jihadist connections. Over the years, media reports of Australian jihadists travelling to Afghanistan, Pakistan, Lebanon and Somalia have been confirmed by evidence heard in open courts, multiple convictions (both locally and overseas), and sometimes by the people involved talking to the media. However, for Australia-Yemen jihadist connections there was no similar confirmation until this incident.

The Kenyan non-connection

Also in June, Chinese and Kenyan newspapers reported that an Australian had been arrested in a Kenyan counter-terrorism raid. I wrote a blog post about it, but the story turned out to be false, demonstrating the above-mentioned point about the importance of revisiting your own writings.

Joining the jihad in Syria

In August a Sydney Sheikh was killed in Syria, bringing attention to the most significant development in Australian jihadism in 2012: involvement in the conflict between the Assad regime and an insurgency that contains jihadist elements. In addition to fund-raising, dozens, if not hundreds, of Australians have travelled to the region since the conflict broke out. They have usually been of Lebanese and Syrian backgrounds and travelled for a variety of reasons, but there are unconfirmed reports that some became involved in jihadist groups fighting against the Assad regime. A recent estimate was that a hundred Australians were involved in either combat or combat support in Syria. Four are reported to have died in the conflict, including one man, Marwan al-Kassab, who was apparently killed in an explosion in Lebanon while manufacturing weapons for Syrian rebels. That would make him the seventeenth Australian reportedly involved in jihadist activities in Lebanon. The Federal Police are openly concerned about Australian involvement and released an official statement warning that taking part in the fighting is illegal.

The Syrian war is particularly significant because Australia’s jihadist plots have involved connections to overseas conflict zones, whether the attacks were guided by an overseas group or involved people who wanted to join such groups but couldn’t. Moral outrage generated by the massacres of Muslims by a nominally secular regime could help draw new people into the jihadist scene, coupled with the fact that many Australians have a personal connection to the region and may travel to support their friends, families and communities but then become involved with the most extreme groups. The conflict also provides opportunities for aspiring jihadists to gain experience, contacts and deadly skills.

The insurgency is not contained solely within Syria. For example, Jordanian authorities recently uncovered an alleged terror plot by al-Qaeda in Iraq-linked jihadists who had gained weapons and expertise from taking part in the Syrian insurgency. The conflict may feed into existing Australia-Lebanon jihadist connections (such as with the groups Fatah al-Islam and Asbat al-Ansar) which are deeply tied to the northern Lebanese town of Tripoli. Ambassador for Counter-Terrorism Bill Paterson recently noted that “northern Lebanese jihadists are increasingly active in Syria, where they are likely to be working with elements of AQ in Iraq, under the banner of Jabhat al Nusra. We cannot exclude the possibility that some Australian-Lebanese dual nationals or other Australians may be among these.” Of all the events in 2012 the Syria conflict the most potential to spur jihadist radicalisation and is worth watching closely.

Communal tensions

The Syria conflict has also increased communal tensions in Australia. Violence between opponents and supporters of Assad has occurred in Melbourne, Sydney and Canberra. Reported incidents include shootings, arson and acts of extortion. ASIO’s recent annual report stated that “…The situation in Syria, with the potential for violence spilling into other parts of the Middle East, increases the possibility of associated communal violence in Australia and remains a concern for ASIO. There are a small number of people actively promoting hatred and inter-communal violence in Australia.” You can watch non-violent manifestations of this tension in this rather frustrating episode of Insight. The conflict has also put Zaky Mallah back in the news, who has reportedly received death threats from local supporters of Syrian jihadists.

Al-Furqan raids

September saw Australian police charge someone with terrorism offences for the first time since 2009. Following the reported exposure of an ASIO informant, police raided several people and properties associated with the al-Furqan Islamic Centre in Melbourne, resulting in one person being charged with “collecting documents being connected with the preparation for the engagement of a person in or assistance in a terrorist act.” I won’t write anything about the case as the trial is ongoing.

Media reports suggest the al-Furqan centre was founded by Skeikh Haron, who was involved in a mainstream Bosnian mosque in Noble Park before splitting away from them (with a small group of followers) about ten years ago. He then became a follower of Melbourne’s main Salafi leader, before falling out with him as well, and then broke away and formed his own small group of about 30-40 followers. You can read all about their views on their website.

Sydney protest

Very shortly after the al-Furqan after, Sydney was dramatically affected by the global protests against an anti-Muslim film, the Innocence of Muslims. A few hundred local Muslims who objected to the film held a protest, which began peacefully although it involved some very extreme and disturbing placards (such as “behead all those who insult the prophet”) as well as some disgusting messages against Coptic Christians (a persecuted minority in Egypt). Things deteriorated further when a small core of angry young men among the protestors carried out violence against property and the police, resulting in several arrests over the following days.

While repeatedly and unanimously condemned by essentially every Muslim organisation in the country (with predictable fringe exceptions such as Hizb ut-Tahrir Australia and al-Furqan), the event had a major impact. It was entirely unexpected and there had been no earlier equivalents (for example, there were no violent protests in Australia against the Danish Mohammed cartoons). The event is not in itself an example of jihadism, but does demonstrate a small but deeply discontented extremist subculture, which has the potential to feed into other cases of extremism and alleged jihadism.

Overall

2012 was busier than 2010 and 2011. While no attempted terrorist attacks occurred but there were various extremist activities related to jihadism. In my view the al-Furqan raids were the most interesting, the Sydney protest was the most surprising, and the involvement of Australians in the Syria conflict is the most important for the future. What these events tell us about the evolution of Australian jihadism will be discussed in the next post.

Update 1: This post originally stated that there were three cases of Australians reportedly being killed while supporting Syrian rebels, but on 30 December there was a fourth case, and the text has been updated accordingly.

To end the year, I will be posting a three-part series on the state of Australian jihadism at the end of 2012.

This first post provides a brief overview of Australian jihadism and its defining features before 2012, and includes several points made in earlier writings of mine. The next posts will look at events that occurred in 2012 to discuss what has happened, how our jihadist scene has changed, and what the future might look like.

“Jihadism” is a contested but commonly-recognised term to encompass the violent global movement represented by al-Qaeda and likeminded organisations and individuals. The 2002 Bali bombings demonstrated the external threat this movement posed to Australia, and several incidents have demonstrated the internal threat.

This includes four major terror plots: an unsuccessful al-Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiah-guided conspiracy to bomb Israeli and Jewish targets during the 2000 Sydney Olympics, a Lashkar e-Toiba-guided plot that was foiled in 2003, two self-starting cells arrested in Melbourne and Sydney in 2005’s Operation Pendennis, and a self-starting (but al-Shabab-connected) plot to attack Holsworthy army barracks in 2009. Clusters of aspiring Australian jihadists had also travelled for training or combat overseas, chiefly to Afghanistan and Pakistan from 1999-2003, Lebanon throughout the 2000s, Somalia from 2007 onwards, and also Yemen. There have also been arrests in miscellaneous countries (Kuwait, Iraq, Kazahkstan) and several other cases of alleged jihadist activity in Australia, such as recruiting, fund-raising, distributing instructional material, threats of violence, and more.

We can identify several key features of jihadism in Australia. First, Australia’s jihadist scene is very small. The most serious activity has involved a few dozen people out of a 476,000-strong Muslim population. If we were to measure it by comparing the number of people charged with jihadism-related offences relative to the size of the Muslim population, Australia’s level of jihadist activity is disproportionately low compared to the UK, France, Spain and some other Western countries. While that’s a very crude and problematic way of measuring it, other indicators (number of plots, reported cases of residents travelling for violent jihad overseas, popularity of extremist but non-violent groups like Hizb ut-Tahrir) would likely still show Australia as having a comparatively low level of activity.

Second, Australia’s jihadist scene is highly interlinked. For example, the early plots—the 2000 al-Qaeda/JI plot, the 2003 LeT-guided plot and the two 2005 Pendennis cells—each involved one or more people from the first clusters of travellers who had attended either an al-Qaeda training camp in Afghanistan or an LeT camp in Pakistan. In addition, the LeT and Pendennis cells contained individuals closely linked, often through friends or family, with people associated with previous plots. In the 2009 Holsworthy plot there was no Afghanistan or Pakistan connection, but there was a direct relationship with an established jihadist organization (al-Shabab) in a conflict zone and social links to an earlier, failed cell. In fact, there have been friendship or family links between most Australian jihadist incidents. In this way, our jihadist scene is very similar to the UK’s, but different to US’s, where plots tend to be self-contained (see pages 420 and 422 of this article).

Third, while Australia’s first two jihadist plots were guided by established organisations, after 2003 they have been self-starting. That is, the subsequent plots had international linkages (and certainly inspiration) but the initiative and planning occurred among the small group of perpetrators, without outside support. Australia’s lack of externally-guided plots after 2003 contrasts with the US, UK, Canada, Germany, Spain, Norway, Sweden, and Denmark, which instead experienced a mixture of externally-guided and self-starting plots.

Fourth, Australia’s jihadist scene has been closely monitored. In both the Pendennis and Neath cases there was evidence of aspiring Australian jihadists attempting to train or fight overseas but being prevented by the state (often through ASIO confiscating their passports). The small and interlinked nature of our jihadist scene, the vast size and budgets of our security agencies, and consistent cooperation from local Muslim communities, have all made this possible. Authorities have investigated and gathered evidence on jihadist plots at their very early stages, and indeed been accused (sometimes accurately) of being overzealous.

Fifth, Australia’s jihadist scene has been quite low-tech. In the four major plots, the jihadists do not appear to have first met each other online, communicated extensively online, or partaken in technologically sophisticated plots. Their main use of the internet appears to have been to download massive amounts of extremist videos and documents (including instructional material). I am less confident on this point as much of the publically available information is dated and very little of the 2009 Holsworthy plot court material has been released. However, the evidence so far suggests the internet has been less important for jihadist radicalisation in Australia than real-world social networks that include people with experience in (or access to) camps and conflict zones.

Sixth, Australian jihadists have demographic characteristics that are similar to jihadists in other Western countries in several ways: they tend to be young Muslim men, to not have had strongly religious upbringings, and generally have a low employment status. However, they also differ in some ways, in that they are somewhat more likely to be native-born, be married and have children than jihadists in Europe. They are also disproportionately poorly educated (compared both to other Australian Muslims and to jihadists in Europe and North America) and are more likely to be of Lebanese heritage.

Finally, Australian jihadism has not been occurring over a long time period. It is largely a post-2000 phenomenon, unlike the US and France which experienced jihadist plots during the 1990s. It also appeared to be declining. The most serious activity occurred from 2003-2005, with the 2009 Holsworthy plot being the most significant incident since. 2010 and 2011 were rather quiet years.

Overall then, before 2012 Australia had a very small, interlinked, closely-monitored, low-tech, and apparently declining jihadist scene, involving young men of somewhat-similar backgrounds to jihadists in other Western countries. It manifested itself in four major plots, many attempts to train or fight in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Lebanon, Somalia and to lesser extent Yemen, and a range of other actions. Their activities tended be externally-guided at first but after 2003 were self-starting.

So did anything change in 2012? The next post will address the key events of this year, and the final one will discuss what has changed and what it means.

Recently I’ve been researching the far-right and became intrigued by a section in the report Blind Spot? Security Narratives and Far-Right Violence in Europe, in which the author identifies both parallels and crucial differences between the old neo-Nazi far-right and the new anti-Muslim far-right. More recently I read Preventing and Countering Far-Right Extremism, a valuable country-by-country report on these movements. One of the authors, Anders Ravik Jupskas, divides far-right movements into three categories: neo-Nazi, white nationalist and anti-Muslim (using slightly different terms). Another of the authors, Matthew Goodwin, wrote of three distinct waves of far-right activity in the UK that closely mirrored these categories.

I’ve become interested in whether this three-way categorisation is valuable or if it is an oversimplification. Are there clear distinguishing characteristics for each of these three categories, and do groups neatly fit into them?

For this reason, I’ve made this table listing what I consider to be the key characteristics of each of these strands, based significantly on those two reports but also on my own research so far.

This typology is of far-right radicalism, not far-right extremism. Therefore all the groups in it are radical (in that their politics diverge substantially from the mainstream) but not all are extremists (hostile to liberal democracy and condoning illegal activity, particularly violence).

The title says “tentative” for a reason. A big reason I established this blog was to get feedback on ideas while they are still in the formative stage. I am keen to hear thoughts (through comments, Twitter or email) on what you think this table may have right or wrong, and why.

A few further points:

This table is largely based on European examples, and might not fit the United States well.

This typology inevitably leads out many movements commonly grouped under the term far-right, such as many anti-abortion movements, Sovereign Citizens, old-fashioned groups established to fight perceived communist threats, etc. It is not meant to be comprehensive, and might be better characterised as a table of far-right groups that oppose the current immigration policies of Western governments.

In practice there can be a lot of overlap between the three categories, as with any typology. For example, an attempt by anti-Muslim groups to create a European wide network with a meeting on 31 March 2012 ran into trouble when a newspaper revealed the neo-Nazi connections of one of the speakers. It was also not very long ago that Nick Griffin was denying the Holocaust (see below).

One reason there is a lot of overlap is because sometimes neo-Nazi or white nationalist leaders make strategic decisions to repackage their ideology in a more palatable manner. For example, neo-Nazi leaders may instruct their followers to not mention Hitler because it drives people away.

Individuals and groups can move from one type to another. In the 1990s Nick Griffin (leader of the British National Party) was denying the Holocaust. However, when he assumed control of the BNP in 1999 he helped steer it away from neo-Nazism to the point where it is now white nationalist and even quite close to being primarily an anti-Muslim movement.

While sometimes the differences between these groups are simply a matter of calculated ideological rhetoric by some leaders, for many participants and leaders the differences are genuine and extremely important. Many people who would join the British National Party would never join a neo-Nazi group, many neo-Nazis would detest the BNP for being pro-Israel, and many non-white people might join anti-Muslim groups but almost never join white nationalist groups.

Many of the anti-Muslim groups would dispute being characterised as anti-Muslim, and claim that they are simply opposed to extremists. In practice, they perceive even the most innocuous Muslim activities as evidence of extremism and clearly hostile to Muslims as a whole.

By “attitude towards the state”, my concern is whether the groups in question see the state as an outright enemy, or whether they simply see it as simply unable or unwilling to counter the perceived threat from non-Whites or Muslims. That neo-Nazi groups are the most hostile to (current) states is shown in how they often direct violence towards the state, their construction of the “Zionist Occupied Government” (ZOG) as the source of their troubles, that they are often opposed to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, that they usually oppose increased security measures and counter-terrorism powers (fearing that they may be the targets), and that they are more willing to break the law.

By contrast, anti-Muslim far-right groups often support these wars and counter-terrorism measures, anticipating that they will be primarily directed at Muslims. As Arun Kundnani has shown, these groups are strongly influenced my mainstream security discourses. Ehud Sprinzak’s writings on “split delegitimization” are valuable here, as he argues that far-right groups usually begin with hostility to a minority and only later, gradually, become disaffected with the state. With the major exception of Breivik, anti-Muslim groups have not directed their violence at the state, whereas neo-Nazi groups have directed violence at the state for decades.

Update 1: Moved the definitions of radicalism and extremism from below the table to above.

Update 2: Storified some of the the Twitter discussion following this post. You can read the discussion here.

ASIO’s most controversial powers allow it to forcibly question people if they may have information that could help prevent a terrorist attack. Based on ASIO’s annual reports, here is a table of how often it has used these coercive questioning powers, followed by some observations on whether it should be allowed to keep them.

For a questioning warrant, someone is summoned by ASIO to be questioned. For a questioning and detention warrant, ASIO physically arrests someone to take them in for questioning. In both cases, the person questioned can face jail for refusing to answer.

In itself, that tells us little about whether these powers are a sinister and excessive form of state control or are a necessary and justified tool to prevent terrorism. Currently, my personal view is that they are justified. In light of re-emerging opposition to these powers, I make the following five points about how these powers have been used.

First, these powers have not been used very often.

ASIO has not used its detention powers at all, and has used its questioning powers 16 times, only once in the past six years. When these powers were introduced, critics charged that they would be abused and have disastrous effects. Now critics are more likely to argue that because these powers have rarely been used, there must be little need for them (particularly the detention warrants) and so they should be taken away.

Second, there are several likely reasons why they haven’t often been used.

One is that Australia, relative to other liberal democracies, particularly the US, UK, France and Spain, faces only a low-level threat of terrorism. Another is that ASIO is no longer the unrestrained organisation that it was up until the 1970s. Two Royal Commissions, internal reforms, new legislation, and the creation of accountability mechanisms such as the Security Appeals Tribunal, the Inspector General of Intelligence and Security, and the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security, have made ASIO a more professional and trustworthy organisation. That said, several problems with ASIO remain and their accountability mechanisms fall short of those in some other democracies.

In addition, when these powers were first proposed by the Howard government, they were to have few safeguards. Eighteen months of negotiation with the Opposition resulted in several safeguards being put in place. These safeguards, which I’ve written about elsewhere, include the following:

–          They must get approval from the Attorney-General before questioning you.

–          They must get further approval from an independent issuing authority, which will be either a judge or magistrate from a federal court.

–          Another independent authority, usually a retired superior court judge, will monitor the entire interrogation.

–          They must ensure you are aware of your right to complain to the Inspector‑General of Intelligence and Security, the Ombudsman and to a police complaints agency.

–          The interrogation must be videotaped.

–          You can have a lawyer with you, though it might not be the lawyer of your choice.

–          Anything you say cannot be used in a prosecution against you, though it may influence the direction of an investigation.

(These are detailed in section 34 of the ASIO Act, and the Independent National Security Legislation Monitor Annual Report.)

These safeguards hopefully helped prevent the powers from being overused or misused. Unfortunately some other ASIO activities, particularly its security assessments of refugees, lacked this sort of accountability.

Third, Operation Pendennis is the likely reason these powers were used 11 times during 2004-2005.

Officially, ASIO has never given a reason why the powers were used extensively in their first few years and only once in the seven years since. However, we can take a safe guess that this is explained by Operation Pendennis. This was a joint operation between ASIO, Federal and State police which resulted in the arrests of 22 people between November 2005 and March 2006. 13 Melbourne men and nine Sydney men were charged over terrorist plots, for which six pleaded guilty and 12 were found guilty by juries. ASIO’s involvement was semi-public and they likely would have been most concerned with the Sydney cell.

The subsequent trial showed that the Sydney cell had acquired tens of thousands of rounds of ammunition, firearms, detonators, chemicals, lab equipment, and instructions on how to use the chemicals to make bombs. There were also indications (never proven in court) that they were acquiring fully automatic weapons and rocket launchers stolen from the army. No terrorist plan in the country since has been as serious as the Sydney Pendennis cell, which is likely why ASIO’s questioning powers were rarely used afterwards. For example, the 2009 Holsworthy Barracks plotters did not get very far by comparison.

Fourth, there is some information available on who ASIO has questioned.

The cloak of secrecy surrounding ASIO is often exaggerated. It is often thought that we have no way of knowing what they are up to, but it’s possible to find some things out. People questioned by ASIO can not talk about it for two years afterwards, but then they are free to. One person coercively questioned by ASIO (probably in the 2009-2010 period) spoke to The Age anonymously. I’m not sure if Zaky Mallah was coercively questioned by ASIO, but this video he made makes it sound like he was (presumably in the 2003-2004 period). Sometimes, the identity of who has been coercively questioned by ASIO can be revealed by a decision to press charges against them for allegedly lying, as happened with Sydney Pendennis cell member Abdul Rakib Hasan (questioned during the 2003-2004 period).

Fifth, overall the case for removing these powers is weak.

Noted earlier, there is currently a campaign to remove these powers, with a prominent role being played by Professor George Williams, who likened them to Pinochet’s Chile. While George Williams has written excellent articles on Australian terrorism law, this claim is completely over-the-top. Coercive questioning powers are quite common in Australia (for example in Royal Commissions), and can be justified if they are used with restraint and if there are adequate safeguards.

Based on Operation Pendennis, it appears likely that these powers have helped prevent at least one terrorist attack. Australia does currently face a small but significant threat from jihadist terrorism and potentially terrorism inspired by other ideologies, particularly far-right extremism. While the terrorist threat is currently quite low by international standards, and looks likely to remain that way in the near-term, it could also escalate unexpectedly as Norway experienced.

Furthermore, there is no current evidence that these powers have been misused. While several injustices have resulted from counter-terrorist action in Australia (see Izhar ul-Haque and Dr. Mohamed Haneef for starters), none are known to have resulted from ASIO’s coercive questioning powers.

Of course, there is not much information to base a judgement on one way or the other. Fortunately, there are currently two independent inquiries examining the appropriateness and effectiveness of Australia’s counter-terrorism laws. There is no doubt that these inquiries will be independent; one is led by former judge Anthony Whealy (who oversaw Sydney Pendennis trial) and the other is led by Bret Walker, who not long ago was a defence lawyer for an accused terrorist. These inquiries will not be shams.

If there is evidence that ASIO’s coercive questioning powers have been used unjustly, hopefully these inquiries will uncover it (and if so, the case for removing these powers will be far stronger than it currently is). For example, there have been persistent claims about ASIO officers inappropriately forcing compliance by threatening to use these powers. Hopefully these inquiries will also reveal whether these powers have in fact helped prevent attacks, so that we no longer have to rely on informed guesswork.

The Age ran an interview today with Abdul Rahman Ayub, a former leader of Jemaah Islamiyah’s Australian branch. As JI’s activities in Australia are not widely-known, here is a short history of how its Australian presence developed, in the context of JI’s own formation and its split from an earlier movement, Darul Islam.

This history has been compiled from notes I had been making for a paper a few months ago, before deciding to focus the paper on a different topic.  I would be keen to hear feedback from JI watchers.

This post largely covers up to 1999 and does not go into detail on the Jack Roche plot and how some JI factions decided to support al-Qaeda’s global terror campaign, which I may address in a follow-up post. Sources have been placed at the bottom.

The global jihadist movement received some support from within Australia during the 1990s, but on a much smaller scale than in Europe. The Australian connections were primarily through small and informal networks which enabled some individuals to train or fight overseas, mainly in Pakistan with Lashkar e-Toiba and in Afghanistan with Al Qaeda.

The most significant formal network in Australia was Mantiqi IV, which resulted in the country’s first planned act of jihadist terrorism, the Jack Roche plot. Mantiqi IV was the local branch of Jemaah Islamiyah, a jihadist organisation based throughout Southeast Asia that had the chief goal of establishing an Islamic State in Indonesia.

Jemaah Islamiyah’s origins lie in Darul Islam, an Islamist movement that waged an insurgency against the Republic of Indonesia until 1962. The Sukarno regime defeated the rebellion and captured, tried and executed its leader, Sekarmadji Karidjan Kartosoewirjo. The Suharto regime, which took power in 1966, continued to suppress Darul Islam. However, attempts by the intelligence organisation Opsus to revive and control this underground movement, in order to manipulate the 1971 election, created a window of opportunity. Darul Islam took advantage, re-gained a national base and re-asserted its challenge to the state through both political activity and violent action.

The movement developed a territorial command structure that mirrored that of the Indonesian army. Its members conceived themselves as belonging to an already existing Islamic State (albeit one that needed to be defended from a secular regime) the Negara Islam Indonesia (NII) declared by Kartosoewirjo  in 1949. Among its members were Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Baku Bashir, who would later establish JI.

Sugnkar and Bashir joined Darul Islam in 1976, and had been Islamist preachers with a significant following in their own right. They ran a school known as Pondok Ngruki, and operated an anti-government radio station until it was shut down in 1975. Their approach to creating an Islamic State differed from that of Darul Islam as a whole, foreshadowing the eventual split. The two preachers were influenced by international Islamist writers such as al-Maududi and Hasan al-Banna, founder of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and had a Middle Eastern-influenced and puritanical understanding of Islam. By contrast, Darul Islam’s understanding of Islam, while absolutist, was heterodox in that it contained Sufi elements and local folk traditions.

More significant were strategic differences. The two preachers adopted a new approach to undermining the state after being arrested in 1978 then released in 1982. Sungkar and Bashir became key figures in the Usroh movement, which was an attempt by at least two factions of Darul Islam to build a new base of support by creating small, interlinked study circles, which was an organisational concept derived from the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. This was more sophisticated, and less overtly confrontational, than Darul Islam’s strategy of creating a shadow government. Sungkar and Bashir also sought further international linkages. During this time, their first connections to Australia developed.

The first key connection resulted from an Australian woman who converted to Islam, Rabiyah Hutchinson, becaming an enthusiastic participant in the Usroh movement. In early 1984, Hutchinson met Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Baku Bashir, worked for a period at their school, Pondok Ngruki, and then travelled to Jakarta and joined one of their Usroh groups. There she met a Darul Islam follower Abdul Rahim Ayub (it was his brother, Abdul Rahman Ayub, who featured in The Age today). Ayub was critical of Sungker and Bashir for deviating from the broader movement, but after Hutchinson introduced Ayub to the two clerics during a trip to Ngruki, he became a loyal disciple.

However, her travels coincided with the Suharto regime’s renewed repression of Islamist opposition. The Indonesian military opened fire on protesters at Tanjung Priok, north of Jakarta, and the authorities detained and tortured several Usroh members. Hutchinson went into hiding with Ayub. The two returned to Ngruki in early 1985 and married each other, with Sungkar officiating. This year was a turning point for Sungkar’s DI faction, and when Indonesia’s Supreme Court ruled that Sungkar and Bashir should be re-imprisoned, they fled to Malaysia with many of their followers. It was also not safe for Hutchinson and Ayub, so they came to live in Australia, where Abdul Rahim Ayub would later be asked by Sungkar to continue their struggle.

Indonesia’s suppression of Islamism in the 1980s resulted in many activists fleeing to other countries. Many more than Abdul Rahim Ayub fled to Australia, though none would later prove to be as central to JI. One person who fled Indonesia after the Tanjung Priok massacre was Zainal Arifan, who was a religious teacher and acquaintance of Abdul Rahim Ayub, and would later prove to be an obstacle to Mantiqi IV.

From Malaysia, Sungkar and Bashir arranged for many of their followers to fight and train with the anti-Soviet mujahideen in Afghanistan. Several of their followers fought with Osama bin Ladin in the Battle of Jaji, and trained with international jihadists in camps in Pakistan, which set the stage for the al-Qaeda-JI relationship that existed in the 1990s.

By this point, differences between Sungkar’s faction and the rest of Darul Islam were becoming clearer. Structurally, Sungkar had established international connections well beyond those of any other DI leader. Strategically, his faction eschewed DI’s unsuccessful overt method of attempting to re-establish an Islamic State, its territorial command model, and did not yet engage in violence in Indonesia, instead making a considered effort to acquire arms, training and experience in anticipation of a coming war. They also understood that the NII did not in any realistic sense exist, because it did not control territory, and hence saw the need for safe-havens in external countries. Sungkar and Bashir used their Malaysian exile to travel widely and build support for their movement, including in Australia.

On April 1990, Hutchinson and Ayub hosted Sungkar and Bashir on their first visit to Australia. They travelled throughout Melbourne and had minor celebrity status among some members of the Indonesian Diaspora as victims of Suharto.

Hutchinson divorced Ayub that year and she left for Pakistan. From this point on Ayub would be responsible for Sungkar and Bashir’s many visits. On January 1991 Ayub contacted Zainal Arifin in Sydney, whom he had not seen in years, and secured his agreement to host the preachers’ next trip. Following a meeting in Sydney, they agreed to form “Darul Islam in exile”, with Abdul Rahim Ayub as head, and under the overall command of Sungkar and Bashir. They raised an estimated $15,000 a year, at this stage the money was given on the basis of opposition to Suharto, and not for terrorist activity (which JI did not engage in until the turn of the century).

Ayub struggled to build a large following, particularly as Zainal Arifin came to leave the movement, along with ten others, refusing to take orders from Sungkar. Ayub then had to move to Sydney look after the small number of Darul Islam followers remaining.

Sungkar and Bashir officially broke away from Darul Islam on January 1, 1993, and declared the establishment of Jemaah Islamiyah. The JI guidelines were delivered to Ayub and he was instructed to lead the group secretly, not mentioning its existence to outsiders. Sungkar and Bashir argued to their Australian supporters that Darul Islam’s lack of territory showed the need to form a new group, with one follower recalling, “Bashir said that to be Darul Islam you need to have a place, some land, but they didn’t have a place or any land, so the view was that the group shouldn’t be named as a state any more but should just be named group or community.”

JI operated along a territorially-based command structure, but unlike Darul Islam, it was more covert and extended across Southeast Asia. By 1997, four such territorially-based commands were established, called Mantiqis. Mantiqi I covered Singapore and Malaysia, Mantiqi II covered most of Indonesia, and Mantiqi III covered Mindanao, Sabah and Sulawesi (in the Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia respectively). Mantiqi IV covered Australia and Papua.

Mantiqi IV’s primary responsibility was fundraising, and Australia was a very low priority for JI. Sidney Jones stated that Mantqi IV was initially intended to be established in Sulawesi, which “implies a mantiqi in Australia was never really a going concern”.  Nasir Abas, who was head of Mantiqi III and later cooperated with authorities, wrote that the Australian branch was never actually a Mantiqi and was not called Mantiqi IV. He states that it was actually called Mantiqi Ukhra, which translates as “another Mantiqi incomplete”, which both suggests Australia’s low importance to the movement and accurately describes its lack of success.

The branch was in many ways a failure, which their unsuccessful attempt to take over administration of a new Mosque being built in Sydney demonstrated. Zainal Arifin was the main imam for the Mosque, but Abdul Rahim Ayub attempted to have his brother, the jihadist veteran Abdul Rahman Ayub (who entered Australia in 1997 and sought refugee status), installed as imam instead. The result was a confrontation that ended with Arifin taking out Apprehended Violence Orders against the Ayub twins. Some Mantiqi IV members remained in Sydney, while others including the Ayubs moved to Perth and tried to recruit Islamic converts and Indonesian students.

Mantiqi IV were widely regarded as the “weak link” in JI. They expended much effort and money on keeping Abdul Rahman Ayub in Australia (he was denied refugee status and faced deportation) and on trying to keep control of the Mantiqi, as the Melbourne and Sydney based members had begun sending money directly to Bashir rather than through the Ayubs. The Mantiqi was always small –ASIO estimated that Mantiqi IV had 30 members and possibly 100 supporters across three States (Abdul Rahman Ayub states similar figures in The Age today) – and relatively dysfunctional. In 1998 JI dispatched Asman Hashim, a veteran of jihad in Mindanao, to Australia to professionalise the branch.

However, the Mantiqi’s presence did result in Australia’s first jihadist plot, because of al-Qaeda’s successful co-optation of a segment of JI through individuals such as Hambali. In 2000 Mantiqi IV member Jack Roche travelled to Afghanistan to fight with the Taliban (Hambili facilitated the trip and was his main point of contact). While there he was asked by senior Al-Qaeda leaders to do reconnaissance for attacks intended to take place during the Sydney Olympics. The targets were the Israeli embassy in Canberra, the Israeli consulate in Sydney, a prominent Jewish businessman in Melbourne. Mantiqi Four was largely unsupportive of the plot (though there are different versions of what happened and the truth isn’t clear) and the Ayubs felt their authority was being undercut, which helped the plot to fail. It’s fortunate that the plot fell apart by itself, as Australian authorities were unaware of it until after the 2002 Bali bombings.

Following the Bali bombings, homes of suspected Mantiqi IV members were raided in Sydney, Melbourne and Perth. Roche was charged over the 2000 bombing plot, and pleaded guilty.

Sources:

Abas, Nasir (2005) Unveiling Jamaah Islamiyah: Confessions of an Ex-JI Member, Jakarta: Grafindo Khazanah Ilmu. (Written in Bahasa Indonesian, I read a later English translation which I can’t find a link for online) Update 1: In the comments Jack Roche has provided a translation, available here.

Chulov, Martin (2006) Australian Jihad: The Battle Against Terrorism From Within and Without, Sydney: Pan Macmillan.

Fealy, Greg and Borgu, Aldo (2005) Local Jihad: Radical Islam and terrorism in Indonesia, Australian Strategic Policy Institute.

Jones, Sidney (2004) Indonesia Backgrounder: Jihad in Central Sulawesi, ICG Asia Report No. 74, Brussels and Jakarta, 3 February.

Jones, Sidney (2010) “ New Order Repression and the Birth of Jemaah Islamiyah” in Soeharto’s New Order and Its Legacy , Canberra: ANU E Press.

Michaelson, Christopher (2005) “Antiterrorism Legislation in Australia: A Proportionate Response to the Terrorist Threat?”, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism vol. 28, iss. 4, pp. 321-339.

Neighbour, Sally (2004) In the Shadow of the Swords: On the Trail of Terrorism From Afghanistan to Australia, Sydney: HarperCollinsPublishers.

Neighbour, Sally (2009) The Mother of Mohammed: An Australian Woman’s Extraordinary Journey into Jihad, Melbourne: Melbourne University Press.

Temby, Quinton (2010) “Imagining an Islamic State in Indonesia: From Darul Islam to Jemaah Islamiyah”, Indonesia, Volume 89 (April).

R v Roche [2005] WASCA 4 (14 January 2005)