Videos about Australia’s role in Afghanistan

Despite being Australia’s longest war, there isn’t a great deal of detailed material available about the ADF’s military effort in Afghanistan. As the deployment winds down, the conflict is likely to get even less coverage or in-depth investigation.

For those who want to know more about what our soldiers have been doing, and what impact they have been having in the country, here is a small selection of videos compiled as a companion piece to this post of research resources.

The first two videos are short segments from Hungry Beast, the third is a double-episode of Four Corners, and the final one is a regular-length Four Corners episode.The Hungry Beast segments are embedded while the Four Corners episodes are linked to. Hungry Beast actually made several more videos about Australia in Afghanistan, including extended interviews with the people in these two segments. Unfortunately the videos on their site are not currently working, so I’ve only included those that I could find on YouTube.

 

Mud, dust & shit
Hungry Beast
17 November 2009

Description

“That is a story, but it’s not the story.” – ‘Tom’, Australian soldier.

Chances are, most of what you have heard about the war in Afghanistan has come via the Australian Defence Force’s Public Relations department. Unlike other coalition forces, Australian journalists find it exceedingly difficult to gain access to our soldiers. Many resort to embedding with our allies to cover conflicts we’re involved in. And while there have been a number of first-person accounts of our allies’ soldiers’ experiences published abroad, we’ve heard almost nothing from the Australian perspective.

When Hungry Beast decided to do a story on the war in Afghanistan, we wanted to focus on personal stories. But when we approached Australian soldiers to ask them what it’s like to fight on the frontline, we were consistently met with one of three responses: polite refusal, open hostility or a referral to Defence PR. We found it increasingly bizarre that our soldiers wouldn’t discuss even the most trivial details of their time at war, and the story became as much about the army’s control over the media as it was about the war in Afghanistan.

Eventually, we found one currently-serving soldier who has served in Afghanistan, who was willing to talk. He offers a rare insight into the mind of someone who, quite literally, puts his life on the line in the name of this conflict. His reasons for speaking out are telling:

“It appalls me that whinging frauds are able to gain the bulk of the media access and press their bogus claims… I can’t change the course of a cultural tsunami of myth making and superficial story telling, but that doesn’t mean I have to accept it.”

Hungry Beast spoke to ‘Tom*’ at length. In this recreation, we have edited and restructured that interview for the sake of length and comprehensibility, but all the words you hear are entirely his own. To protect his identity, ‘Tom’ has been played by actors Aden Young, Dan Wyllie, Lewis Fitz-Gerald and Rodger Corser.

*not his real name.

 

Defence secrecy
Hungry Beast
21 March 2011

http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_detailpage&v=X-f2FPkKhCY

Description:

Hungry Beast reports on claims from inside the Australian Army that the Department of Defence, under Minister for Defence Stephen Smith, is routinely using ‘operational security concerns’ to delay or withhold from public release information, images and footage relating to operations in Afghanistan that have been cleared for public release by ADF commanders on the ground.

There is a growing sense of frustration among soldiers that this skews public perception of the conflict and our soldiers’ role in it, by focusing on the ‘bad news’ stories of injuries, deaths, civilian casualties or alleged misconduct by Australian troops and not providing material that could help contextualise the environment soldiers are operating in.

We interviewed former Chief of Army (2002-2008) Lt Gen Peter Leahy, and former Army Officer James Brown, who both assert that this problem stems from over-centralisation and control of information by Defence Public Affairs and the Minister’s office.

Both men say the responsibility for release of information should be ‘devolved down’ to lower-level commanders on the ground, in line with the practices of other coalition forces, to ensure timely and effective release of information.

The Defence Minister declined our requests for an interview for this story. But a spokesperson for the Minister did provide written answers to questions submitted to the Department of Defence by Hungry Beast.

 

A careful war
Four Corners
5 and 12 July 2010

View the two-part episode here

Description:

Chris Masters delivers two ground level reports giving a soldier’s-eye view of the bloody war being waged against the Taliban in Afghanistan.

Part one offers a rare and powerful insight into the perspectives of the soldiers fighting in conflict-torn Afghanistan.

In the second part of the report, Australian troops head into unchartered territory, trying to win the faith and trust of a brutalised people.

Cameraman Neale Maude wins Walkley Award for Best Camera Work.

The Broadband Edition includes extended interviews with members of Alpha Company who talk candidly about the impact of the war on their lives. Plus a reporters’ diary, and a behind-the-scenes interview with the Four Corners team.

 

In their sights
Four Corners
6 September 2011

Video available here

Description:

A Four Corners team investigates both the merits and the risks of the “kill-capture” campaign. Its proponents claim that the strategy has been successful in killing enemy commanders, but several missions involving elite Australian soldiers have gone horribly wrong, killing “friendly” local leaders and civilians.

Ask most Australians what the “strategy” in Afghanistan is and they would tell you it’s about winning the hearts and minds of the population. The Government talks about the need to improve security, protect the population, build schools and hospitals and a lasting stable government. But running parallel with this “hearts and minds” approach is another far more contentious and highly secretive strategy – it’s called “kill-capture”. Using mostly Special Forces, the Coalition has been hunting down Taliban commanders one by one.

The program is massive and increasing. In the last year an estimated 11,000 insurgents and their leaders have been killed or captured. The strategy is to disrupt, dismantle and demoralise the insurgents, forcing them to the negotiating table.

Their leaders are taken out night after night after night, their caches of equipment supplies, their money supplies are cut off, so the idea is you start to grind down the enemy’s will and its capability to fight and an important part of that is going after those leaders. ISAF General

But for all its perceived success, some are questioning the strategy and the unintended consequences it’s delivering. First, experts say, killing the established leadership has led to a new generation of younger even more radical insurgents. The second problem comes when the raids go wrong.

Each raid is only as good as the intelligence it’s based on. Evidence shows that in a number of cases the intelligence is not reliable and in others it appears Coalition forces have been manipulated by their Afghan allies into settling old scores and killing tribal rivals. As a result, families are divided and devastated, local populations become alienated and angry, leading some into the arms of the Taliban.

A Four Corners team reports on how the “kill-capture” strategy developed, how it’s being implemented and expanded and finally examines the fall-out when things go wrong. The program gets access to the families and eye witnesses who were present when elite Australian troops undertook “kill-capture” missions. The program investigates three incidents, revealing why, in two cases, it appears the wrong people were killed and in another a suspect already detained was shot dead at close range.

After a decade of war in Afghanistan, is the “kill-capture” strategy doing more harm than good?

An ASIO indefinite detention collection

This is a collection of pieces I’ve written about Australia indefinitely detaining refugees who receive adverse security assessments.

There are currently 60-odd people who have had their asylum claims assessed by Department of Immigration and Citizenship (DIAC) and been certified as genuine refugees, but have then been deemed security risks by ASIO. They are detained for potentially the rest of their lives (based on decisions made in closed processes) because of poorly-founded claims that national security requirements leave no other option.

I’ve put these five articles and posts together, with summaries, to act as a backgrounder on this topic. Each piece contains plenty of links for anyone doing further research, and they are presented in chronological order.

 

Give refugees the right to appeal security assessments – just like the rest of us
The Conversation
03 May 2012

This article was prompted by a report released in March 2012 by the Joint Select Committee on Australia’s Immigration Detention Network. That report called for adversely assessed refugees to be given the right to appeal through the Security Appeals Division of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal.

The Immigration Minister and his Opposition counterpart were rejecting the calls for appeal rights by simply asserting “national security”. This article pointed out that the proposed appeal method did not involve making intelligence public, and argued that there were no compelling national security arguments against it.

On December 2012 there was some progress, as the government established a review mechanism headed by former judge Margaret Stone. But this falls short of the independent scrutiny that could be applied by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal, and even this semi-appeal mechanism faces the prospect of being shut down by a Coalition Government after the next election.

 

ASIO and indefinite detention: choosing the wrong target
The Murphy Raid
21 May 2012

This article addressed some activists who placed the blame for this situation chiefly on ASIO, and who saw these detentions as evidence of an intelligence agency out of control.

The article argued the responsibility does not lie with ASIO but with the legislation, and therefore our elected leaders. It outlined how the detention process worked and the relevant laws and policies that result in people being indefinitely detained with no right of appeal. It argued that ASIO was simply following the law, and that making a bogeyman of ASIO was misguided for three reasons.

First, because it directs the focus away from the people actually responsible. Second, an intelligence agency in a liberal democracy has no business challenging the legislation that governs it. Third, it plays into the false portrayal of this refugee dilemma as one of security versus softness.

 

Resources: new information about ASIO security assessments
The Murphy Raid
03 July 2012

This post presented two new sources that shed some light on how the security assessment process actually worked.

One was an Australian National Audit Office report that gave a large-scale overview of ASIO assessments, (for visa applicants, people applying for sensitive jobs etc) with plenty of statistics and a particular focus on boat arrivals.

The other was the transcripts of the proceedings of a High Court challenge to detention by one of the adversely assessed refugees. Some parts of the transcripts provided new information on the actual process of the security assessment, and whether they met the standards of procedural fairness.

 

What do ASIO’s adverse security assessments of refugees actually mean?
Right Now (originally published in The Murphy Raid)
7 May 2013

This article put aside the questions of appeal rights and procedural fairness to look at the bigger question of whether an adverse assessment should result in indefinite detention at all.

It made the point that an ASIO adverse assessment is an intelligence-based predictive judgement that someone might pose a risk. The assessments are not comparable to criminal convictions and do not prove these people to be dangerous. It argued that adverse assessments do not justify indefinite detention, that it is difficult to find a single security expert who supports the government’s current approach and that there are alternative ways of addressing security risks.

 

As a High Court challenge looms, are there alternatives to Australia’s indefinite detention policy?
The Conversation
22 May 2013

This article explored what some of the alternatives to indefinite detention actually are.

It argued that the adversely assessed refugees could be released on conditional visas and then subjected to various security measures depending on the threat posed. These measures include surveillance, criminal charges if the continued active support for LTTE while in Australia, proscribing the LTTE, control orders, and control order-like measures imposed through DIAC.

Some of the alternatives have their own dilemmas that would need to be debated (the old Temporary Protection Visas had unnecessary restrictions on employment, control orders and group proscription raise various civil liberties issues, etc). In my view the options chosen should be tailored to the specific security risk each individual is assessed to pose and there should be independent oversight and periodic review to ensure that any restrictions on liberty are only maintained as long as necessary.

However, the article was not intended prescribe a specific ideal solution, but to demonstrate how weak the case for indefinite detention is by showing that there are plenty of alternatives. It would be a sign of progress if public discussion moved on from simply accepting indefinite detention to debating the best alternatives to it.

 

I hope you find those five pieces useful. For those who want to help change this tragic situation, I recommend you visit Letters For Ranjini.

Resources: three new reports on national security, intelligence and terrorism in Australia

Just a quick post presenting three very interesting reports tabled in parliament over the past two days.

Independent National Security Legislation Monitor – declassified annual report 20th December 2012
Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet
14 May 2013

Council of Australian Governments review of counter-terrorism legislation
Council of Australian Governments
14 May 2013

Inquiry into the gathering and use of criminal intelligence
Parliamentary Joint Committee on Law Enforcement
15 May 2013

Enjoy.

Resources: Australia’s role in Afghanistan updated

The Australian government recently announced that it will withdraw the bulk of its military force in Afghanistan before the end of year.

For those interested in what the Australian Defence Force has been doing in Afghanistan and the context it operated in, here is an updated version of an older post of research resources on the topic.

The original post was motivated by our media’s unfortunate lack of in-depth discussion of this conflict, which partly result from the Department of Defence’s restrictive media policies.

Aside from tweaking the writing and fixing dead links, the main updates include:

  1. Replacing the older Parliamentary Library report with the more recent one.
  2. Adding a report from the Feinstein Centre.
  3. In the “further sources” section, adding a report from Save the Children report and several reports recommended by Tom Hyland.
  4. Removing the discussion of the TLO report controversy (still available at the older post).

This list is in two sections. For the sources in the “key sources” section, I have provided descriptions and some personal thoughts. The “further sources” section contains reports I have either not read or not thought worth including in the first section. I am not an Afghanistan specialist or a military specialist, so some of the “further sources” may be just as valuable as the “key sources”. All the key sources are open-access and in pdf format.

All the reports focus on Uruzgan province (the ADF’s main theatre of operations in the country) or on Australia’s role more broadly. None focus on the Afghan war in general (if you want that, see this mammoth bibliography), they have been chosen specifically for their relevance to Australian involvement.

 

Key sources:

Australia’s involvement in Afghanistan: revised facts and figures
Nicole Brangwin, Marty Harris, Ravi Tomar and David Watt
Parliamentary Library
September 2012

This paper is what it sounds like. It contains key data on Australia’s contribution, not just from Defence but also the other government departments such as DFAT and AusAID. The paper presents funding figures, key dates, government statements and other information, along with many links for further research. Originally produced to help politicians prepare for the October 2010 Parliamentary debate on Afghanistan, it has been thoroughly updated since.

It is a useful starting point for anyone writing on this topic.

 

Winning hearts and minds in Uruzgan province
Paul Fishstein
Feinstein International Center
August 2012

This paper presents the results of a large-scale study on the effectiveness of aid projects in promoting security. This paper focuses on Uruzgan, which was one of five Afghan provinces covered in the larger study. The researchers interviewed over 120 people in Uruzgan, both Afghans and internationals.

The results are not comforting. The paper finds “widespread negative perceptions of aid projects” as a result of aid becoming entangled in local power politics. Local powerbrokers, such as Jan Mohammad Khan and Matiullah Khan (discussed more in reports below) not only manipulated aid to their advantage, but also manipulated Western military forces. The report argues that they “pursued personal agendas and vendettas which they ‘sold’ to the international forces as pursuit of high value targets and Taliban.”

The paper also examined the different approaches of the three international military forces in Uruzgan (Dutch, American and Australian) and found that “dissatisfaction was largely directed at the Australians.”

 

Two Afghan views of Australia from Uruzgan
Omaid Khpalwak and Governor Mohammed Shirzad
Lowy Institute for International Policy
November 2011

The first half of this paper consists of notes taken by Afghan journalist Omaid Khpalwak, who was sadly killed by US forces on July 2011, after being mistaken for an insurgent.

He interviewed many locals about what they thought of the Australian presence in Uruzgan, with reactions ranging from firm support to strong criticism. The criticisms are mostly for their support of Matiullah Khan, but also for night-raids and civilian casualties.

The second half is an interview with Uruzgan Governor Mohammed Shirzad, conducted by Susan Schmeidl and Hekmatullah Aazamy. Shirzad is supportive of the ADF presence and confident of improvements in the security situation, though also critical about civilian casualties. He makes some suggestions regarding operations and development projects.

This paper differs from the others here by being brief, and light on details, but is important for showing the diversity of Afghan views on the ADF’s role.

 

Counterinsurgency in Uruzgan 2009
Colonel Peter Connolly
Land Warfare Studies Centre, Australian Army
August 2011

This paper examines Australian operations in Uruzgan in the second half of 2009, and is written by one of the commanders involved. It covers the role of the Second Mentoring and Reconstruction Task Force in providing security for the elections and training the 4th Brigade of the Afghan National Army, in the context of an active “fighting season.”

The detailed and acronym-laden text is aimed at a military audience, but is otherwise readable and includes personal accounts of Peter Connolly’s service. It is valuable for covering the task force’s many adaptations in the six-month period. It also shows the difficult decisions ADF commanders have to make in operations, which is not easily conveyed in media coverage.

 

In it for the long haul? Delivering Australian aid to Afghanistan
Phil Sparrow
Australian Council for International Development
March 2011

If there has been little in-depth media coverage of the ADF’s role, there has been almost none of the role played by AusAID and various NGOs. That makes this paper on Australia’s aid programs in Afghanistan – government and non-government – particularly valuable.

Like the Parliamentary Library report above, this paper has a strong focus on facts and figures, and runs through the role of various government departments and NGOs. However, it also makes a strong analytic contribution. It discusses successes and failures and is particularly critical of aid programs being incorporated into counter-insurgency, instead of being needs-driven. It argues that this militarisation of aid undermines its purpose, which harms the stabilisation effort as a whole.

 

The man who would be King: challenges to strengthening governance in Uruzgan
Susan Schmeidl
Netherlands Institute of International Relations
November 2010

This paper and the next give detailed accounts of Uruzgan politics post-2001. They are indispensable for understanding the context the ADF operates in, and the impact the ISAF forces overall may be having on the local population. It is not a simple matter of the foreign forces being either occupiers or protectors. Rather, foreign forces are operating in an area with complex pre-existing power-structures, and their interaction with these power-structures will shape the war’s outcome.

This paper focuses on the failure to create effective governance in Uruzgan. It argues that this has allowed local strongmen to hold government positions while actually undermining the state, which the Taliban capitalise on for their own ends. One example discussed is again Matiullah Khan, who is now police chief of Uruzgan. Khan was regardedby Australia as a valuable ally, but by the Ducth as a dangerous warlord who should be kept at arm’s length. He has proven periodically controversial in the media, particularly after it was revealed that some of his fighters were taken to Australia for training.

The paper is a highly detailed account of the key actors in Uruzgan (not just Khan but many others), demonstrates how power functions in the province, and ends with recommendations for improving governance.

 

The battle for Afghanistan: Zabul and Uruzgan
Martine van Bijlert
New America Foundation
September 2010

This paper examines the Taliban’s resurgence in Uruzgan and the neighbouring province of Zabul. It attributes the insurgency’s strength to networks of fighters dating back to the Soviet occupation, neglect by the central government, and supporters based in Pakistan. Similar to Schmeidl’s report, it also argues that Karzai-era strongmen (who have become de facto ISAF allies) alienated particular communities who have then turned to the Taliban. In other words, it argues that much of the insurgency was avoidable.

While the previous paper was a lengthy, detailed analysis of power relations in Uruzgan, this more concise paper shows specifically how those dynamics affect the insurgency. It is based on solid research (including 300 interviews) and is possibly the best short-but-detailed account of insurgency in Uruzgan available.

I strongly recommend it.

 

Further sources:

Access restricted: a review of remote monitoring practices in Uruzgan province
Save the Children Australia
November 2012

Uruzgan: 18 months after the Dutch/Australian leadership handover
The Liaison Office
April 2012

Death of an Uruzgan journalist: command errors and ‘collateral damage’
Afghanistan Analysts’ Network
25 April 2012
(This report is on the death of Omaid Khpulwak, who was described as one of the most promising Afghan journalists of his generation and whose work featured in the above-mentioned Lowy report)

Backgrounder: Karzai appoints four provincial governors
Institute for the Study of War
23 April 2012
(This 3-page backgrounder provides some information on Matiullah Khan)

3D ‘The next generation’. Lessons learned from Uruzgan for future operations
Netherlands Institute of International Relations
December 2011

Mission Uruzgan: collaborating in multiple coalitions for Afghanistan
Amsterdam University Press
June 2012
(book)

The Australian Army after Afghanistan
Security Challenges Journal
Winter 2011

Exiting Afghanistan: challenges to transition
Australian Strategic Policy Institute
March 2011

The Dutch engagement in Uruzgan
The Liaison Office
May 2010

Australia in Afghanistan: quick guide
The Nautilus Institute
October 2010

Other reports and articles relevant to Australia’s role in Afghanistan can be found on the websites of the Afghanistan Analysts’ Network, the Australian Army Journal and The Liaison Office.

Resources: how to think about Australian national security

Prime Minister Julia Gillard recently released the first Australian National Security Strategy.

As there is already plenty of commentary available on it, this post provides some background material to help readers assess the Strategy themselves.

Here are three valuable academic papers, published last year, about conceptualising security threats to Australia and devising a national security strategy. All three are open access and in PDF format.

 

Conceptualising future threats to Australia’s security
Andrew O’Neil

Much of the recent Australian security studies literature has focused on contemporary challenges to Australia’s role in Asia, the evolving trajectory of defence strategy, and the various factors that have shaped the nation’s ‘discourse of threats’. While this body of work is important and valuable, there is a distinct lack of scholarship that discusses the types of future security threats likely to confront Australian policy makers in the twenty-first century. Indeed, there is a tendency among scholars to assume that this sort of ‘futures’ work is best left to those outside the academy. I argue, however, that it is an area which is too important to leave to the authors of defence white papers, think tank reports, and classified strategic assessments. Australia’s future security environment in a complex international system has not been subject to the sort of systematic scholarly analysis that the topic merits. This paper seeks to provide a stepping stone for more substantial work in the area, and outlines a conceptual framework that can aid us in understanding the factors likely to impact on Australia’s security environment in the early part of the twenty-first century.

 

An Australian National Security Strategy: competing conceptual approaches
Peter Layton

There is a growing global interest in formulating national security strategies but their form, nature and usefulness depends greatly on the conceptual approach policymakers choose to base them on. The three different national security approaches of grand strategy, opportunism and risk management have different purposes, parameters and implications. The first major issue to be considered when devising an Australian National Security Strategy is which organising construct to adopt.

 

Australia’s national security priorities: addressing strategic risk in a globalised world
Alan Dupont and William J. Reckmeyer.

This article reviews the seminal influences on Australian national security planning and outlines a methodology for assessing national security risk which provides a workable analytical framework for prioritising Australia’s national security challenges and allocating scarce resources in a systematic and integrated way. The authors argue for a System of Systems approach that addresses the most serious security challenges as a whole rather than treating them as independent, compartmentalised issues. The ability to develop effective analytical tools for assessing national security risk will be a key determinant of strategic success in the twenty-first century. Nations adept at anticipating developments, discerning trends and evaluating risk among the clutter of confusing and contradictory change indicators will be significantly advantaged over those which are not.

Resources: the works of Shandon Harris-Hogan

My GTReC colleague Shandon has published some excellent pieces on terrorism in Australia. I’ve compiled a list of them here.

Enjoy.

 

Academic articles

The Unseen Terrorist Connection: Exploring Jihadist Links between Lebanon and Australia“, Terrorism and Political Violence, 2014. (co-authored with Andrew Zammit)

Mohamed Merah: From Petty Criminal to Neojihadist“, Politics, Religion and Ideology, (vol. 14, iss. 2) 21 June 2013. (co-authored with Virginie Andre)

Anatomy of a Terrorist cell: a Study of the Network Uncovered in Sydney in 2005”, Behavioural Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression, 21 September 2102.

The Australian Neojihadist Network: Origins, Evolution and Structure”, Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict, (vol. 5, iss. 1) 13 July 2012.

Australian Neo-Jihadist Terrorism: Mapping the Network and Cell Analysis Using Wiretap Evidence”, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, (vol.35, iss. 4) 19 March 2012.

 

Other publications

The Australian link to Hezbollah and the Bulgaria bus bombing, The Conversation, 12 February 2013.

Gun control could help the fight against homegrown terrorism, The Conversation, 16 January 2013.

Inspire magazine: inciting terrorism in Australia? The Conversation, 10 December 2012.

The conflict at home and abroad: Australian involvement in Syria, The Conversation, 9 November 2012.

Remembering the Bali bombings ten years on, The Conversation, 12 October 2012.

Domestic terror raids: a timely reminder of a persistent threat, The Conversation, 14 September 2012.

 

Resources: Australian counter-insurgency in Afghanistan.

On Monday, Lateline aired a story about AusAid cancelling a $US4.6 million contract with The Liaison Office, a Kabul-based NGO. This was allegedly because its report on the war effort in Uruzgan province lacked a positive spin. Whether or not that’s true, it highlights how rare it is to get reliable and nuanced information on Australia’s role in Afghanistan.

One problem has been restrictive media policies put in place by the Department of Defence, which have resulted in an unfortunate lack of in-depth discussion.  There is little easily-accessible information on what Australian forces are actually doing, or of what impact they may be having in Uruzgan province, the operational focus of the deployment. Relatively few Australian scholars specialise in Afghanistan.

This post presents a selection of reports released in the past two years that make clearer what the ADF is doing and the context they operate in.

The first six listings include descriptions and some personal thoughts. After that is a list of reports for which I haven’t provided summaries, because I haven’t read them yet.

All the reports focus on Uruzgan or on Australia’s role more broadly. None focus on the Afghan war in general; I chose them parochially for their relevance to Australian involvement.

Some of these are by government agencies and some are by independent organisations. All are open-access and in pdf format.

 

Australia’s involvement in Afghanistan: revised facts and figures
Nicole Brangwin, Marty Harris, Ravi Tomar and David Watt
Parliamentary Library
November 2011

This paper is what it sounds like. It contains key data on Australia’s contribution, not just in terms of Defence but also the other government departments such as DFAT and AusAID. The paper presents funding figures, key dates, government statements and other information, along with many links for further research. Originally produced to assist Members and Senators prepare for the October 2010 Parliamentary debate on Afghanistan, it has been thoroughly updated since.

I recommend it as a useful starting point for anyone writing on this topic.

 

Two Afghan views of Australia from Uruzgan
Omaid Khpalwak and Governor Mohammed Shirzad
Lowy Institute for International Policy
November 2011

The first half of this paper consists of notes taken by Afghan journalist Omaid Khpalwak, who was sadly killed by US forces on July 2011, after being mistaken for an insurgent.

He interviewed many locals about what they thought of the Australian presence in Uruzgan, with reactions ranging from firm support to strong criticism. The criticisms are mostly for their support of Matiullah Khan (discussed more in reports below), but also for night-raids and civilian casualties.

The second half is an interview with Uruzgan Governor Mohammed Shirzad, conducted by Susan Schmeidl and Hekmatullah Aazamy. Shirzad is supportive of the ADF presence and confident of improvements in the security situation, though also critical about civilian casualties. He makes some suggestions regarding operations and development projects.

This paper differs from the others here by being brief, and light on details, but is important for showing the diversity of Afghan views on the ADF’s role.

 

Counterinsurgency in Uruzgan 2009
Colonel Peter Connolly
Land Warfare Studies Centre, Australian Army
August 2011

This paper examines Australian operations in Uruzgan in the second half of 2009, and is written by one of the commanders involved. It covers the role of the Second Mentoring and Reconstruction Task Force in providing security for the elections and training the 4th Brigade of the Afghan National Army, in the context of an active “fighting season.”

The detailed and acronym-laden text is aimed at a military audience, but is highly readable and includes personal accounts of Peter Connolly’s service. It is valuable for covering the task force’s many adaptations in a mere six-month period. It also shows the difficult decisions ADF commanders have to make in operations, which is not easily conveyed in media coverage.

 

In it for the long haul? Delivering Australian aid to Afghanistan
Phil Sparrow
Australian Council for International Development
March 2011

If there has been little in-depth media coverage of the ADF’s role, there has been almost none of the role played by AusAID and various NGOs. That makes this paper on Australia’s aid programs in Afghanistan – government and non-government –particularly valuable.

Like the Parliamentary Library report above, this paper has a strong focus on facts and figures, and runs through the role of various government departments and NGOs. However, it also makes a strong analytic contribution. It discusses successes and failures and is particularly critical of aid programs being incorporated into counter-insurgency, instead of being needs-driven. It argues that this militarisation of aid undermines its purpose, which harms the stabilisation effort as a whole.

 

The man who would be King: challenges to strengthening governance in Uruzgan
Susan Schmeidl
Netherlands Institute of International Relations
November 2010

This paper and the next give detailed accounts of Uruzgan politics post-2001. They are indispensable for understanding the context the ADF operates in, and the impact ISAF forces overall may be having on the local population. It is not a simple matter of being either occupiers or protectors. Rather, foreign forces are operating in an area with complex pre-existing power-structures, and their interaction with these power-structures will shape the war’s outcome.

This paper focuses on the failure to create effective governance in Uruzgan. It argues that this has allowed local strongmen to hold government positions while actually undermining the state, which the Taliban capitalise on for their own ends. One example discussed is Matiullah Khan, now police chief of Uruzgan, who was regarded as a valuable ally by Australia and a dangerous warlord by the Dutch. He has proven periodically controversial in the media, particularly after it was revealed that some of his fighters were taken to Australia for training.

The paper is a highly detailed account of the key actors in Uruzgan (not just Khan but many others), demonstrates how power functions in the province, and ends with recommendations for improving governance.

 

The battle for Afghanistan: Zabul and Uruzgan
Martine van Bijlert
New America Foundation
September 2010

This paper examines the Taliban’s resurgence in Uruzgan and the neighbouring province of Zabul. It attributes the insurgency’s strength to networks of fighters dating back to the Soviet occupation, neglect by the central government, and supporters based in Pakistan. Similar to Schmeidl’s report, it also argues that Karzai-era strongmen (who have become de facto ISAF allies) alienated particular communities who have then turned to the Taliban. In other words, it argues that much of the insurgency was avoidable.

While the previous paper was a lengthy, detailed analysis of power relations in Uruzgan, this more concise paper shows specifically how those dynamics affect the insurgency. It is based on solid research (including 300 interviews) and is possibly the best short-but-detailed account of insurgency in Uruzgan available.

I strongly recommend it.

 

Further sources:

Uruzgan: 18 months after the Dutch/Australian leadership handover
The Liaison Office
April 2012
(This is the above-mentioned report that featured on Lateline)

Death of an Uruzgan journalist: Command errors and ‘collateral damage’
Afghanistan Analysts’ Network
25 April 2012
(This report is on the death of Omaid Khpulwak, who was described as one of the most promising Afghan journalists of his generation and whose work featured in the above-mentioned Lowy report)

Backgrounder: Karzai appoints four provincial governors
Institute for the Study of War
23 April 2012
(This 3-page backgrounder provides some information on Matiullah Khan)

Exiting Afghanistan: Challenges to transition
Australian Strategic Policy Institute
March 2011

The Australian Army after Afghanistan
Security Challenges Journal
Winter 2011

Other reports and articles relevant to Australia’s role in Afghanistan can be found on the websites of the Afghanistan Analysts’ Network, the Australian Army Journal and The Liaison Office.

Resources: new information about ASIO security assessments.

ASIO security assessments are currently controversial, because refugees deemed to be security risks are detained, indefinitely, with no right to appeal. The media has covered this well recently, but it’s hard to find information on the assessment process itself.

This post presents two new sources that became available in June. I have not read them in full, but they should be very useful for anyone researching this issue.

 

The first is this report released on Monday by the Australian National Audit Office (ANAO): Security Assessments of Individuals.

It gives a large-scale overview of ASIO assessments, not just of visa applicants but also of people applying for sensitive jobs, and counter-terrorism security assessments. The report provides plenty of statistics, covers changes in assessment practices over time, and has a particular focus on boat arrivals. Some of the information is also in ASIO’s annual reports, but this paper puts all that in one place.

The audit examined 411 randomly chosen cases and gives largely positive findings:

18. Within this context, the ANAO concluded that ASIO’s arrangements for providing security assessments of individuals to client agencies are robust and, broadly, effective. The agency has a sound governance framework in place, including strategic risk management arrangements that are updated regularly. There is an effective mechanism to report to the ASIO Executive and the Government on risks that affect security assessment processes, including most recently, the emerging area of risk arising from the rapidly increasing number of security checks for immigration community detention cases. However, at an operational level, there are some aspects of the security assessment regime that deserve further focus. These aspects limit assurance that the agency is making sound assessments that result in non-prejudicial advice, and that the recent initiatives implemented to reduce the IMA security assessment caseload are being managed sustainably. It is also important to address impediments to mutual accountability between ASIO and its client agencies, and that ASIO puts in place workforce planning strategies to respond to future changes in demand for security assessments.

It also shows how extensive ASIO’s security assessment role is:

    3. In the last six years, ASIO has completed, on average, 179 847 security assessments annually. The number of security assessments completed varies from year to year and between assessment types. Over this period (from 2005–06 to 2010–11), ASIO completed between:

  • 34 000 and 73 000 visa security assessments annually (around 20 per cent to 40 per cent of the annual security assessment caseload);
  • 18 000 and 31 000 personnel security assessments annually (around nine per cent to 16 per cent of the annual caseload); and
  • 65 000 to more than 135 000 counter-terrorism security assessments annually (around 40 per cent to 66 per cent of the annual caseload).

 

The second source is the proceedings of the recent challenge to indefinite detention, available at: Plaintiff M47/2012 v. Director-General of Security & Ors.

While the ANAO report did not give information on how ASIO actually assesses someone’s potential threat to security, these High Court proceedings give some insight into one person’s assessment process. The plaintiff in the case is a Sri Lankan Tamil, who was found to be a refugee but then failed an ASIO assessment because of involvement with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, and is now locked up with little hope of release.

Most of the proceedings don’t examine the actual assessment, but some bits do. The man argued he was denied procedural fairness by not being given a chance to respond to the following allegations against him:

(a) that the plaintiff maintained further involvement with LTTE Intelligence activities from 1999-2006;

(b) that the plaintiff remains supportive of the LTTE’s use of violence to achieve political objectives; and

(c) that the plaintiff is likely to continue to support the LTTE activities of security concern in and from Australia.

See page 18 of the plaintiff’s submission.

The government side disputed the claim, arguing that:

The transcript of the interview (Special Case, Attachment 5) demonstrates that ASIO informed the Plaintiff of the purpose of the interview and provided him with an opportunity to provide any information that he wished in relation to each of the following topics:

40.1. whether he was a voluntary and active member of the LTTE Intelligence Wing from 1996-1999;

40.2. whether his responsibilities included identifying Sri Lankan Army collaborators;

40.3. whether he was aware that his identifying of Sri Lankan Army collaborators likely led to extra judicial killings

40.4. whether he maintained further involvement in intelligence activities on behalf of the L TTE from 1999 to 2006;

40.5. whether, during the interview, he deliberately withheld information regarding his activities of security concern, and provided mendacious information; and

40.6. whether his purpose in withholding information and providing mendacious information was to conceal his activities with the LTTE.

The focus of the interview was upon the Plaintiff’s membership and role with the LTTE in Sri Lanka. A particular focus was whether he joined the LTTE voluntarily, and then performed his roles with the LTTE voluntarily, which had obvious ramifications for the existence and degree of his support for the LTTE. The Plaintiff repeatedly insisted that he was forced to join LTTE.

Consequently, it was futile for ASIO to explore with the Plaintiff whether his past voluntary association with the LTTE meant that he remains supportive of, or would continue to support, the LTTE. His denial of the premise for any such questioning had the consequence that any questions about whether he remained supportive, or was likely to continue to support, the LTTE, could only have been asked on the premise that his denials were false. Such questioning would have been pointless. Procedural fairness did not require it to occur.

See pages 10-11 of the defendant’s submission.

It will be interesting to see whether the High Court finds that the process met the standards of procedural fairness, and the Court’s findings could change how these assessments are done in future.

Resources: datasets on jihadism

This blog will intermittently post lists of security-related resources, beginning with this selection of sources for quantitative information on jihadist terrorism.

The datasets are divided according to whether they focus on individuals involved in jihadism (usually covering demographic characteristics) or on jihadist incidents (covering things like methods of attack). Datasets that include both have been placed in the individuals section.

Within those categories, they are divided into whether they are free or behind paywalls.

A special note is made if the data is disaggregated. Those ones don’t simply say “45% of the sample was born in the US” but provide lists of each individual or incident, with specific details. These ones are the most valuable, but less common.

Some of the links go directly to tables or charts, others go to articles or reports that contain the dataset within.

Lastly, this list is still in progress, so if you know of any good ones I’m missing, please say so in the comments section.

 

Jihadist individuals – open access

Altunbas, Yener and Thornton, John (2009) Human Capital and the Supply of Homegrown Islamic Terrorists in the UK, Social Science Research Network.

Atran, Scott; John Jay & Artis Transnational Terrorism Database  Website which contains disaggregated data in excel sheets.

Bakker, Edwin (2006) Jihadi Terrorists in Europe, Clingendael: Netherlands Institute of International Relations.

Felter, Joseph and Fishman , Brian (2007) Al Qa’ida’s Foreign Fighters in Iraq: A First Look at the Sinjar Records, New York: Combating Terrorism Centre at West Point.

Fishman , Brian, ed. (2008) Bombers, Bank Accounts, and Bleedout: al-Qa`ida’s Road in and Out of Iraq, New York: Combating Terrorism Centre at West Point.

Gambetta, Diego and Hertog, Stephen (2007) Engineers of Jihad, London: University of Oxford.

Gartenstein-Ross, Daveed and Grossman, Laura (2009) Homegrown Terrorists in the U.S. and U.K.: An Empirical Examination of the Radicalization Process, Washington DC: Federation for Defense of Democracies.

Jenkins, Brian (2010) Would be Warriors: Incidents of Jihadist Radicalization in the United States Since September 11, 2001, Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation.

Kurzman, Charles (2011) Muslim-American Terrorism Since 9-11: An Accounting, Triangle Center on Terrorism and Homeland Security, 2 February. Disaggregated.

Kurzman, Charles and Schanzer, David and Moosa, Ebrahim (2010) Anti-Terror Lessons of Muslim-Americans, Washington DC: US Department of Justice, 6 January.

MPA Workshop (2010) Jihadi Terrorist Prosecutions Since 9/11 Database,New America Foundation. A recently updated, user-friendly and disaggregated version of the data is available here

Zammit, Andrew (2011) Who becomes a jihadist in Australia? ARC Linkage Project Conference on Radicalisation.

 

Jihadist individuals – paywalled

Haddad, Simon (2010) “Fatah al-Islam: Anatomy of a Terrorist Organisation”, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism vol. 33, iss. 6, pp. 548-569.

Leikin, Robert (2006) “The Quantitative Analysis of Terrorism and Immigration: An Initial Exploration”, Terrorism and Political Violence, iss. 18, pp. 503-521.

Mullins, Sam (2011) “Islamist Terrorism and Australia: An Empirical Examination of the ‘Home-Grown’ Threat”, Terrorism and Political Violence, vol.23, iss. 2, pp. 254-285.

Porter, Louise and Kebbell, Mark (2010) “Radicalisation in Australia: Examining Australia’s Convicted Terrorists”, Psychiatry, Psychology and Law, June.

Stenersen, Anne (2011) “Al Qaeda’s Foot Soldiers: A Study of the Biographies of Foreign Fighters Killed in Afghanistan and Pakistan Between 2002 and 2006“, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, March, pp. 171 – 198.

Simcox, Robin and Stuart, Hannah and Ahmed, Houriya (2010) Islamist Terrorism: the British Connections London: The Centre for Social Cohesion. 26 page preview available for free, full report can be purchased in hard copy. Disaggregated.

 

Jihadist incidents – open access

Bjelopera, Jerome P. and Randol, Mark A. (2010) American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat, Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, 7 December. Disaggregated.

Nesser, Petter (2010)”Chronology of Jihadism in Western Europe Update 2008-2010“, Working Paper, Kjeller: Norwegian Defene Research Establishment, 20 December. Disaggregated.

Sageman, Marc (2009) “Confronting al-Qaeda: Understanding the Threat in Afghanistan”, Perspectives on Terrorism, vol. 3, no. 4.

Europol (2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012), Europol Terrorism Situation and Trend Reports, European Police Office.

 

Jihadist incidents – paywalled

Jordan, Javier (2012) “Analysis of Jihadi Terrorism Incidents in Western Europe 2001-2010”, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, April, pp. 382-484. Disaggregated.

Nesser, Petter  (2008) “Chronology of Jihadism in Western Europe 1994–2007: Planned, Prepared, and Executed Terrorist Attacks”, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, October, pp. 924-946. Disaggregated.

Crone, Manni and Harrow, Martin (2011) “Homegrown Terrorism in the West“, Terrorism and Political Violence, August, pp. 521-536. The disaggregated data is available here.

End of list. Hopefully these sources will assist anyone trying to develop informed opinions on jihadism – a topic many people hold strong opinions on with little empirical basis.