Jihadists and bushfires: let’s not go nuts

On Sunday the Sydney Morning Herald reported that “al-Qaeda has named Australia as a prime target for terrorism by firebombing in an online terrorism and bomb-making magazine.”

This was in reference to Inspire magazine, an English language publication by al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, which attempts to incite jihadist sympathisers in the West to carry out violence. The latest issue (9) provided instructions on how to start bushfires, and mentioned Australia both as a target and as an example of the damage bushfires have caused.

Alongside a picture of the Sydney Opera House were the words:

On December 2002 and in the south of Australia, flames of fire caused the eruption of 79 conflagrations in New South Wales, it spread to its environs. There were more than 4500 firefighters struggling to stop fires burning. Those crews were even backed up with helicopters’ support. It is considered the worst event of wild fires during 30 years. 19 houses were damaged at first and then, the fire went towards Sydney city where a firestorm erupted. It burnt down more than 500 houses. In that horrifying day, this firestorm released a heat energy equal to that of 23 nuclear bombs.

Later on the article broadly described the best times and places to start fires in several countries, including Australia.

It’s important not to make too much of every perceived threat. In 2009, there was completely unfounded speculation that terrorists were behind the Black Saturday bushfires. Victoria Police had to step in and debunk these claims.

Inspire produces these articles not just to incite attacks, but to generate fear. It’s already partly achieved that. By not mentioning any other threatened countries, the Sydney Morning Herald gave the misleading impression that the Inspire article was focused only on Australia. Inspire listed the prime targets for pyro-terrorism as the US, UK and Israel, followed by NATO countries. It was not aimed only at Australia as the Herald’s coverage implied.

Given the risk of the Inspire article creating further unnecessary fear, this post explores the likelihood of an al-Qaeda inspired bushfire attempt actually happening here.

Calls to attack the West with bushfires are not new; they have occasionally featured on jihadist internet forums since at least 2006.  One widely-cited example is a posting that called for jihadists to light bushfires in “the United States, in Europe, in Russia and in Australia”. That posting attributed the idea to renowned strategist Abu Musab al-Suri, who had been an influential figure for many in the movement (including some Australian jihadists arrested in 2005*).

Jarret Brachman said of this, “We’re definitely going to see more of calls for these kinds of operations in the future….The question that American security professionals and first responders will have to wrestle with is whether anyone will be answering these calls.” So far, the answer is few or none.

Dozens of jihadist plots, possibly over a hundred**, have occurred in the West over the past decade. Of these plots, there does not appear to have been a single proven case of an attempt to light bushfires.

One possible exception is that in 2003 a jihadist detainee in FBI custody claimed there was a plan to start simultaneous bushfires in several US states. But to my knowledge (I am very willing to be corrected here) no jihadist in Western Europe, North America or Australasia has actually been convicted, or even charged, of planning to light one.

Israel has faced terrorist-lit bushfires, but it is in a very different situation facing a different movement. Pyro-terrorism certainly exists, but it has barely featured in the al-Qaeda inspired global jihad. Despite urgings for bushfire attacks, the foot soldiers proved reluctant to actually try it.

Based on the writings of several specialists, we can gather some likely reasons for this.

Adam Dolnik has pointed out that lighting fires was “generally not considered a glorious type of attack” in the global jihadist movement. Jihadists see themselves as warriors, and lighting bushfires is very un-warlike compared to bombings and shootings (even of civilian targets).

Killing civilians at all is a difficult step to take. Many jihadists first try to fight on battlefields in Afghanistan, Iraq, Chechnya, Bosnia and elsewhere. They often turn towards attacks on the West after being redirected by leaders at training camps, or after finding they can’t reach the battlefield.

Even then, a significant number are hesitant to carry out the sort of attacks al-Qaeda calls for – bombings of civilian targets with high symbolic or economic value, like mass transit facilities. As J.M. Berger has shown, a third of all jihadists in the US during the post-9/11 decade were plotting to attack military targets at home or abroad, even though jihadist leaders urged otherwise.

If killing civilians is itself a difficult threshold to cross, it should not be surprising that very few jihadists cross the threshold of trying to kill them in the blatantly un-warlike ways that Inspire magazine suggests. We have also not seen jihadists welding blades to trucks as suggested in the second issue of Inspire.

Another reason is that promptings for these type of attacks have not come from the highest levels of al-Qaeda. According to the CTC analysis of the recently al-Qaeda documents, bin Laden was not impressed by the unconventional attack methods proposed by Inspire.

A further reason, raised by Anthony Bergin in the Sydney Morning Herald article, is that jihadists would be concerned that a bushfire attack would have little value as the state could just deny terrorists were responsible.

Last, Adam Dolnik’s excellent book finds a key factor prompting innovation in terrorist groups is the repeated experience of failed operations, forcing them to adapt. While al-Qaeda as an organisation has experienced many failures and adapted to them, the typical jihadist in the West is not an experienced veteran. These foot soldiers tend to be newcomers to violence, without a record of involvement in earlier, failed attacks. As a result, they tend to be imitative rather than innovative, and hence stick to bombings and shootings.

So what does this tell us?

Basically, it’s not a big threat. Jihadist bushfire plots in Western countries have been extremely rare, possibly non-existent, in the past. Future trends cannot be assumed to resemble past trends, but if the likely reasons for the rarity of these attacks remain valid, bushfire terrorsm in the West will be very rare for the near-future.

If some of the above reasons become invalid – for example, if more senior jihadist figures urge pyro-terrorism – this will likely have less impact in Australia than in the US and Europe, as they have a much greater frequency of jihadist plots.

It can of course be argued that a jihadist bushfire could happen here, and certainly security agencies and emergency services should be prepared for many conceivable contingencies. But it is a safe bet that the next jihadist plot in Australia won’t be an attempt to start bushfires, and that the next bushfires will not be lit by jihadists.

*For al-Suri’s influence on some Australian jihadists see paras 457, 503, and 549 of Benbrika & Ors v The Queen [2010] VSCA 281 (25 October 2010) and paras 33.3, 33.18, 33.21, and 45(d) of R v Benbrika & Ors (Ruling No 1) [2011] VSC 76 (11 March 2011) including footnotes.

**The number depends on how a plot is defined, as different writers use different criteria to decide what constitutes a plot. See the incident databases here.

Update 1: Thanks to @El_Grillo1 for pointing out that bushfire threats had been on the forums since at least 2006, not 2007 as I originally wrote.

Resources: datasets on jihadism

This blog will intermittently post lists of security-related resources, beginning with this selection of sources for quantitative information on jihadist terrorism.

The datasets are divided according to whether they focus on individuals involved in jihadism (usually covering demographic characteristics) or on jihadist incidents (covering things like methods of attack). Datasets that include both have been placed in the individuals section.

Within those categories, they are divided into whether they are free or behind paywalls.

A special note is made if the data is disaggregated. Those ones don’t simply say “45% of the sample was born in the US” but provide lists of each individual or incident, with specific details. These ones are the most valuable, but less common.

Some of the links go directly to tables or charts, others go to articles or reports that contain the dataset within.

Lastly, this list is still in progress, so if you know of any good ones I’m missing, please say so in the comments section.

 

Jihadist individuals – open access

Altunbas, Yener and Thornton, John (2009) Human Capital and the Supply of Homegrown Islamic Terrorists in the UK, Social Science Research Network.

Atran, Scott; John Jay & Artis Transnational Terrorism Database  Website which contains disaggregated data in excel sheets.

Bakker, Edwin (2006) Jihadi Terrorists in Europe, Clingendael: Netherlands Institute of International Relations.

Felter, Joseph and Fishman , Brian (2007) Al Qa’ida’s Foreign Fighters in Iraq: A First Look at the Sinjar Records, New York: Combating Terrorism Centre at West Point.

Fishman , Brian, ed. (2008) Bombers, Bank Accounts, and Bleedout: al-Qa`ida’s Road in and Out of Iraq, New York: Combating Terrorism Centre at West Point.

Gambetta, Diego and Hertog, Stephen (2007) Engineers of Jihad, London: University of Oxford.

Gartenstein-Ross, Daveed and Grossman, Laura (2009) Homegrown Terrorists in the U.S. and U.K.: An Empirical Examination of the Radicalization Process, Washington DC: Federation for Defense of Democracies.

Jenkins, Brian (2010) Would be Warriors: Incidents of Jihadist Radicalization in the United States Since September 11, 2001, Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation.

Kurzman, Charles (2011) Muslim-American Terrorism Since 9-11: An Accounting, Triangle Center on Terrorism and Homeland Security, 2 February. Disaggregated.

Kurzman, Charles and Schanzer, David and Moosa, Ebrahim (2010) Anti-Terror Lessons of Muslim-Americans, Washington DC: US Department of Justice, 6 January.

MPA Workshop (2010) Jihadi Terrorist Prosecutions Since 9/11 Database,New America Foundation. A recently updated, user-friendly and disaggregated version of the data is available here

Zammit, Andrew (2011) Who becomes a jihadist in Australia? ARC Linkage Project Conference on Radicalisation.

 

Jihadist individuals – paywalled

Haddad, Simon (2010) “Fatah al-Islam: Anatomy of a Terrorist Organisation”, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism vol. 33, iss. 6, pp. 548-569.

Leikin, Robert (2006) “The Quantitative Analysis of Terrorism and Immigration: An Initial Exploration”, Terrorism and Political Violence, iss. 18, pp. 503-521.

Mullins, Sam (2011) “Islamist Terrorism and Australia: An Empirical Examination of the ‘Home-Grown’ Threat”, Terrorism and Political Violence, vol.23, iss. 2, pp. 254-285.

Porter, Louise and Kebbell, Mark (2010) “Radicalisation in Australia: Examining Australia’s Convicted Terrorists”, Psychiatry, Psychology and Law, June.

Stenersen, Anne (2011) “Al Qaeda’s Foot Soldiers: A Study of the Biographies of Foreign Fighters Killed in Afghanistan and Pakistan Between 2002 and 2006“, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, March, pp. 171 – 198.

Simcox, Robin and Stuart, Hannah and Ahmed, Houriya (2010) Islamist Terrorism: the British Connections London: The Centre for Social Cohesion. 26 page preview available for free, full report can be purchased in hard copy. Disaggregated.

 

Jihadist incidents – open access

Bjelopera, Jerome P. and Randol, Mark A. (2010) American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat, Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, 7 December. Disaggregated.

Nesser, Petter (2010)”Chronology of Jihadism in Western Europe Update 2008-2010“, Working Paper, Kjeller: Norwegian Defene Research Establishment, 20 December. Disaggregated.

Sageman, Marc (2009) “Confronting al-Qaeda: Understanding the Threat in Afghanistan”, Perspectives on Terrorism, vol. 3, no. 4.

Europol (2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012), Europol Terrorism Situation and Trend Reports, European Police Office.

 

Jihadist incidents – paywalled

Jordan, Javier (2012) “Analysis of Jihadi Terrorism Incidents in Western Europe 2001-2010”, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, April, pp. 382-484. Disaggregated.

Nesser, Petter  (2008) “Chronology of Jihadism in Western Europe 1994–2007: Planned, Prepared, and Executed Terrorist Attacks”, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, October, pp. 924-946. Disaggregated.

Crone, Manni and Harrow, Martin (2011) “Homegrown Terrorism in the West“, Terrorism and Political Violence, August, pp. 521-536. The disaggregated data is available here.

End of list. Hopefully these sources will assist anyone trying to develop informed opinions on jihadism – a topic many people hold strong opinions on with little empirical basis.

Is there really a right to silence?

The Age reported yesterday that 350 Victorians have been compelled to answer questions about drug trafficking, murder and corruption before a government-appointed Chief Examiner. This little-known body was set up to investigate Melbourne’s gangland killings, and people who refuse to answer questions can face five years in jail.

Civil libertarians and legal bodies objected strongly, arguing that the right to silence is one of our most fundamental rights.

This had me wondering: is the right to silence a fundamental human right? Or is it a lesser right, which is ok to override at times?

Put another way, if you have information that can help stop murderers, why should you have the right to keep silent about it? But also, is it dangerous to give the state the power to coerce information out of you, and what if you don’t actually have the information they think you do?

There is no widely accepted view on this. The right to silence does not appear in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, but it does sort-of appear in article 14(g) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which specifies the right to “not to be compelled to testify against himself or to confess guilt.”

This demonstrates the most common argument in favour of the right to silence, which is the protection against incriminating yourself, so that police and prosecutors can’t coerce or trick you into making a false confession.

When pondering this on Twitter, some Tweeps kindly raised a second objection: that arguing the state has the right to coerce information out of people is one step towards justifying torture.

However, the right to silence has often been denied without resulting in anything approaching these disaster scenarios. One example is ASIO’s questioning powers, the most controversial coercive questioning powers in this country.

Currently, if ASIO believe you have information relevant to a terrorist act, they can detain you for questioning, and threaten you with five years of jail for refusing to answer. However, if they intended to mistreat you or induce a false confession, they would face the following hurdles:

–          They must get approval from the Attorney-General before questioning you.

–          They must get further approval from an independent issuing authority, which will be either a judge or magistrate from a federal court.

–          Another independent authority, usually a retired superior court judge, will monitor the entire interrogation. They must ensure you are aware of your right to complain to the Inspector‑General of Intelligence and Security, the Ombudsman and to a police complaints agency.

–          The interrogation must be videotaped.

–          You can have a lawyer with you, though it might not be the lawyer of your choice.

–          Anything you say cannot be used in a prosecution against you, though it may influence the direction of an investigation.

(These are detailed in section 34 of the ASIO Act, and the Independent National Security Legislation Monitor Annual Report. It’s worth remembering that many of these safeguards were not in the original ASIO amendments introduced after 9-11, and it was the ALP under Crean and Beazley who forced the Howard government to include these protections.)

The ASIO example suggests the right to silence can be overridden while still protecting the right against self-incrimination and mistreatment. And if those crucial rights can be protected, it is hard to see why the right to silence should be considered a fundamental human right that trumps the need to tackle serious crime.

As for Victoria’s Chief Examiner, I’m not sure if its questioning powers are constrained by as many safeguards as ASIO’s are. Also, it has used its powers much more frequently than ASIO, having coercively questioned 350 people since 2005, while ASIO has coercively questioned 11 people since 2004-2005 (judging by its annual reports to Parliament).

So it would be good to know more about what the Chief Examiner is up to, but it’s unlikely to be very sinister. The Age article points out that the Chief Examiner requires Supreme Court approval before using its special powers, that the Special Investigations Monitor gave it a clean report, and that none of the 350 people coercively questioned lodged a complaint.

Lastly, denying the right to silence when investigating serious crimes is not a radical step. Bret Walker SC, the Independent National Security Legislation Monitor, has pointed out that “powers to compel persons to attend and answer questions concerning the suspected wrongdoing of others” are common, and have been used by “bodies such as the Australian Crime Commission, the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, the Australian Securities and Investments Commission, the Independent Commission Against Corruption and the New South Wales Crime Commission.”

Given this, my view is that the right to silence is not a fundamental human right. It is a procedural right, which has developed in our legal system for very good reasons, but is not inviolable. It can be justifiably denied in some circumstances, as long as there are safeguards to protect the truly fundamental rights.

It begins

I’ve started a blog to express thoughts on terrorism, security, human rights and other issues, usually with an Australian focus.

My main job is being a researcher at Monash’s Global Terrorism Research Centre. I’ve been inspired to start blogging by my friends’ blogs, the difficulty of engaging in in-depth discussions over Twitter, and a recent Lowy Interpreter debate over why academics rarely engage in blogging. Specifically, I was prompted by a contribution made by Alex Burns, who argued in favour of “semi-digested thought bubbles” and stated that blogging “can help you to self-reflect and to write more productively.” Hopefully, this is what will happen. Reflection and productivity are my key goals, and critical feedback on any posts is most welcome.

The site is bare-bones for now. Blogrolls, categories, RSS feeds, pictures and such will come later if I keep up regular posting.