To end the year, I will be posting a three-part series on the state of Australian jihadism at the end of 2012.

This first post provides a brief overview of Australian jihadism and its defining features before 2012, and includes several points made in earlier writings of mine. The next posts will look at events that occurred in 2012 to discuss what has happened, how our jihadist scene has changed, and what the future might look like.

“Jihadism” is a contested but commonly-recognised term to encompass the violent global movement represented by al-Qaeda and likeminded organisations and individuals. The 2002 Bali bombings demonstrated the external threat this movement posed to Australia, and several incidents have demonstrated the internal threat.

This includes four major terror plots: an unsuccessful al-Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiah-guided conspiracy to bomb Israeli and Jewish targets during the 2000 Sydney Olympics, a Lashkar e-Toiba-guided plot that was foiled in 2003, two self-starting cells arrested in Melbourne and Sydney in 2005’s Operation Pendennis, and a self-starting (but al-Shabab-connected) plot to attack Holsworthy army barracks in 2009. Clusters of aspiring Australian jihadists had also travelled for training or combat overseas, chiefly to Afghanistan and Pakistan from 1999-2003, Lebanon throughout the 2000s, Somalia from 2007 onwards, and also Yemen. There have also been arrests in miscellaneous countries (Kuwait, Iraq, Kazahkstan) and several other cases of alleged jihadist activity in Australia, such as recruiting, fund-raising, distributing instructional material, threats of violence, and more.

We can identify several key features of jihadism in Australia. First, Australia’s jihadist scene is very small. The most serious activity has involved a few dozen people out of a 476,000-strong Muslim population. If we were to measure it by comparing the number of people charged with jihadism-related offences relative to the size of the Muslim population, Australia’s level of jihadist activity is disproportionately low compared to the UK, France, Spain and some other Western countries. While that’s a very crude and problematic way of measuring it, other indicators (number of plots, reported cases of residents travelling for violent jihad overseas, popularity of extremist but non-violent groups like Hizb ut-Tahrir) would likely still show Australia as having a comparatively low level of activity.

Second, Australia’s jihadist scene is highly interlinked. For example, the early plots—the 2000 al-Qaeda/JI plot, the 2003 LeT-guided plot and the two 2005 Pendennis cells—each involved one or more people from the first clusters of travellers who had attended either an al-Qaeda training camp in Afghanistan or an LeT camp in Pakistan. In addition, the LeT and Pendennis cells contained individuals closely linked, often through friends or family, with people associated with previous plots. In the 2009 Holsworthy plot there was no Afghanistan or Pakistan connection, but there was a direct relationship with an established jihadist organization (al-Shabab) in a conflict zone and social links to an earlier, failed cell. In fact, there have been friendship or family links between most Australian jihadist incidents. In this way, our jihadist scene is very similar to the UK’s, but different to US’s, where plots tend to be self-contained (see pages 420 and 422 of this article).

Third, while Australia’s first two jihadist plots were guided by established organisations, after 2003 they have been self-starting. That is, the subsequent plots had international linkages (and certainly inspiration) but the initiative and planning occurred among the small group of perpetrators, without outside support. Australia’s lack of externally-guided plots after 2003 contrasts with the US, UK, Canada, Germany, Spain, Norway, Sweden, and Denmark, which instead experienced a mixture of externally-guided and self-starting plots.

Fourth, Australia’s jihadist scene has been closely monitored. In both the Pendennis and Neath cases there was evidence of aspiring Australian jihadists attempting to train or fight overseas but being prevented by the state (often through ASIO confiscating their passports). The small and interlinked nature of our jihadist scene, the vast size and budgets of our security agencies, and consistent cooperation from local Muslim communities, have all made this possible. Authorities have investigated and gathered evidence on jihadist plots at their very early stages, and indeed been accused (sometimes accurately) of being overzealous.

Fifth, Australia’s jihadist scene has been quite low-tech. In the four major plots, the jihadists do not appear to have first met each other online, communicated extensively online, or partaken in technologically sophisticated plots. Their main use of the internet appears to have been to download massive amounts of extremist videos and documents (including instructional material). I am less confident on this point as much of the publically available information is dated and very little of the 2009 Holsworthy plot court material has been released. However, the evidence so far suggests the internet has been less important for jihadist radicalisation in Australia than real-world social networks that include people with experience in (or access to) camps and conflict zones.

Sixth, Australian jihadists have demographic characteristics that are similar to jihadists in other Western countries in several ways: they tend to be young Muslim men, to not have had strongly religious upbringings, and generally have a low employment status. However, they also differ in some ways, in that they are somewhat more likely to be native-born, be married and have children than jihadists in Europe. They are also disproportionately poorly educated (compared both to other Australian Muslims and to jihadists in Europe and North America) and are more likely to be of Lebanese heritage.

Finally, Australian jihadism has not been occurring over a long time period. It is largely a post-2000 phenomenon, unlike the US and France which experienced jihadist plots during the 1990s. It also appeared to be declining. The most serious activity occurred from 2003-2005, with the 2009 Holsworthy plot being the most significant incident since. 2010 and 2011 were rather quiet years.

Overall then, before 2012 Australia had a very small, interlinked, closely-monitored, low-tech, and apparently declining jihadist scene, involving young men of somewhat-similar backgrounds to jihadists in other Western countries. It manifested itself in four major plots, many attempts to train or fight in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Lebanon, Somalia and to lesser extent Yemen, and a range of other actions. Their activities tended be externally-guided at first but after 2003 were self-starting.

So did anything change in 2012? The next post will address the key events of this year, and the final one will discuss what has changed and what it means.

Recently I’ve been researching the far-right and became intrigued by a section in the report Blind Spot? Security Narratives and Far-Right Violence in Europe, in which the author identifies both parallels and crucial differences between the old neo-Nazi far-right and the new anti-Muslim far-right. More recently I read Preventing and Countering Far-Right Extremism, a valuable country-by-country report on these movements. One of the authors, Anders Ravik Jupskas, divides far-right movements into three categories: neo-Nazi, white nationalist and anti-Muslim (using slightly different terms). Another of the authors, Matthew Goodwin, wrote of three distinct waves of far-right activity in the UK that closely mirrored these categories.

I’ve become interested in whether this three-way categorisation is valuable or if it is an oversimplification. Are there clear distinguishing characteristics for each of these three categories, and do groups neatly fit into them?

For this reason, I’ve made this table listing what I consider to be the key characteristics of each of these strands, based significantly on those two reports but also on my own research so far.

This typology is of far-right radicalism, not far-right extremism. Therefore all the groups in it are radical (in that their politics diverge substantially from the mainstream) but not all are extremists (hostile to liberal democracy and condoning illegal activity, particularly violence).

The title says “tentative” for a reason. A big reason I established this blog was to get feedback on ideas while they are still in the formative stage. I am keen to hear thoughts (through comments, Twitter or email) on what you think this table may have right or wrong, and why.

A few further points:

This table is largely based on European examples, and might not fit the United States well.

This typology inevitably leads out many movements commonly grouped under the term far-right, such as many anti-abortion movements, Sovereign Citizens, old-fashioned groups established to fight perceived communist threats, etc. It is not meant to be comprehensive, and might be better characterised as a table of far-right groups that oppose the current immigration policies of Western governments.

In practice there can be a lot of overlap between the three categories, as with any typology. For example, an attempt by anti-Muslim groups to create a European wide network with a meeting on 31 March 2012 ran into trouble when a newspaper revealed the neo-Nazi connections of one of the speakers. It was also not very long ago that Nick Griffin was denying the Holocaust (see below).

One reason there is a lot of overlap is because sometimes neo-Nazi or white nationalist leaders make strategic decisions to repackage their ideology in a more palatable manner. For example, neo-Nazi leaders may instruct their followers to not mention Hitler because it drives people away.

Individuals and groups can move from one type to another. In the 1990s Nick Griffin (leader of the British National Party) was denying the Holocaust. However, when he assumed control of the BNP in 1999 he helped steer it away from neo-Nazism to the point where it is now white nationalist and even quite close to being primarily an anti-Muslim movement.

While sometimes the differences between these groups are simply a matter of calculated ideological rhetoric by some leaders, for many participants and leaders the differences are genuine and extremely important. Many people who would join the British National Party would never join a neo-Nazi group, many neo-Nazis would detest the BNP for being pro-Israel, and many non-white people might join anti-Muslim groups but almost never join white nationalist groups.

Many of the anti-Muslim groups would dispute being characterised as anti-Muslim, and claim that they are simply opposed to extremists. In practice, they perceive even the most innocuous Muslim activities as evidence of extremism and clearly hostile to Muslims as a whole.

By “attitude towards the state”, my concern is whether the groups in question see the state as an outright enemy, or whether they simply see it as simply unable or unwilling to counter the perceived threat from non-Whites or Muslims. That neo-Nazi groups are the most hostile to (current) states is shown in how they often direct violence towards the state, their construction of the “Zionist Occupied Government” (ZOG) as the source of their troubles, that they are often opposed to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, that they usually oppose increased security measures and counter-terrorism powers (fearing that they may be the targets), and that they are more willing to break the law.

By contrast, anti-Muslim far-right groups often support these wars and counter-terrorism measures, anticipating that they will be primarily directed at Muslims. As Arun Kundnani has shown, these groups are strongly influenced my mainstream security discourses. Ehud Sprinzak’s writings on “split delegitimization” are valuable here, as he argues that far-right groups usually begin with hostility to a minority and only later, gradually, become disaffected with the state. With the major exception of Breivik, anti-Muslim groups have not directed their violence at the state, whereas neo-Nazi groups have directed violence at the state for decades.

Update 1: Moved the definitions of radicalism and extremism from below the table to above.

Update 2: Storified some of the the Twitter discussion following this post. You can read the discussion here.

ASIO’s most controversial powers allow it to forcibly question people if they may have information that could help prevent a terrorist attack. Based on ASIO’s annual reports, here is a table of how often it has used these coercive questioning powers, followed by some observations on whether it should be allowed to keep them.

For a questioning warrant, someone is summoned by ASIO to be questioned. For a questioning and detention warrant, ASIO physically arrests someone to take them in for questioning. In both cases, the person questioned can face jail for refusing to answer.

In itself, that tells us little about whether these powers are a sinister and excessive form of state control or are a necessary and justified tool to prevent terrorism. Currently, my personal view is that they are justified. In light of re-emerging opposition to these powers, I make the following five points about how these powers have been used.

First, these powers have not been used very often.

ASIO has not used its detention powers at all, and has used its questioning powers 16 times, only once in the past six years. When these powers were introduced, critics charged that they would be abused and have disastrous effects. Now critics are more likely to argue that because these powers have rarely been used, there must be little need for them (particularly the detention warrants) and so they should be taken away.

Second, there are several likely reasons why they haven’t often been used.

One is that Australia, relative to other liberal democracies, particularly the US, UK, France and Spain, faces only a low-level threat of terrorism. Another is that ASIO is no longer the unrestrained organisation that it was up until the 1970s. Two Royal Commissions, internal reforms, new legislation, and the creation of accountability mechanisms such as the Security Appeals Tribunal, the Inspector General of Intelligence and Security, and the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security, have made ASIO a more professional and trustworthy organisation. That said, several problems with ASIO remain and their accountability mechanisms fall short of those in some other democracies.

In addition, when these powers were first proposed by the Howard government, they were to have few safeguards. Eighteen months of negotiation with the Opposition resulted in several safeguards being put in place. These safeguards, which I’ve written about elsewhere, include the following:

–          They must get approval from the Attorney-General before questioning you.

–          They must get further approval from an independent issuing authority, which will be either a judge or magistrate from a federal court.

–          Another independent authority, usually a retired superior court judge, will monitor the entire interrogation.

–          They must ensure you are aware of your right to complain to the Inspector‑General of Intelligence and Security, the Ombudsman and to a police complaints agency.

–          The interrogation must be videotaped.

–          You can have a lawyer with you, though it might not be the lawyer of your choice.

–          Anything you say cannot be used in a prosecution against you, though it may influence the direction of an investigation.

(These are detailed in section 34 of the ASIO Act, and the Independent National Security Legislation Monitor Annual Report.)

These safeguards hopefully helped prevent the powers from being overused or misused. Unfortunately some other ASIO activities, particularly its security assessments of refugees, lacked this sort of accountability.

Third, Operation Pendennis is the likely reason these powers were used 11 times during 2004-2005.

Officially, ASIO has never given a reason why the powers were used extensively in their first few years and only once in the seven years since. However, we can take a safe guess that this is explained by Operation Pendennis. This was a joint operation between ASIO, Federal and State police which resulted in the arrests of 22 people between November 2005 and March 2006. 13 Melbourne men and nine Sydney men were charged over terrorist plots, for which six pleaded guilty and 12 were found guilty by juries. ASIO’s involvement was semi-public and they likely would have been most concerned with the Sydney cell.

The subsequent trial showed that the Sydney cell had acquired tens of thousands of rounds of ammunition, firearms, detonators, chemicals, lab equipment, and instructions on how to use the chemicals to make bombs. There were also indications (never proven in court) that they were acquiring fully automatic weapons and rocket launchers stolen from the army. No terrorist plan in the country since has been as serious as the Sydney Pendennis cell, which is likely why ASIO’s questioning powers were rarely used afterwards. For example, the 2009 Holsworthy Barracks plotters did not get very far by comparison.

Fourth, there is some information available on who ASIO has questioned.

The cloak of secrecy surrounding ASIO is often exaggerated. It is often thought that we have no way of knowing what they are up to, but it’s possible to find some things out. People questioned by ASIO can not talk about it for two years afterwards, but then they are free to. One person coercively questioned by ASIO (probably in the 2009-2010 period) spoke to The Age anonymously. I’m not sure if Zaky Mallah was coercively questioned by ASIO, but this video he made makes it sound like he was (presumably in the 2003-2004 period). Sometimes, the identity of who has been coercively questioned by ASIO can be revealed by a decision to press charges against them for allegedly lying, as happened with Sydney Pendennis cell member Abdul Rakib Hasan (questioned during the 2003-2004 period).

Fifth, overall the case for removing these powers is weak.

Noted earlier, there is currently a campaign to remove these powers, with a prominent role being played by Professor George Williams, who likened them to Pinochet’s Chile. While George Williams has written excellent articles on Australian terrorism law, this claim is completely over-the-top. Coercive questioning powers are quite common in Australia (for example in Royal Commissions), and can be justified if they are used with restraint and if there are adequate safeguards.

Based on Operation Pendennis, it appears likely that these powers have helped prevent at least one terrorist attack. Australia does currently face a small but significant threat from jihadist terrorism and potentially terrorism inspired by other ideologies, particularly far-right extremism. While the terrorist threat is currently quite low by international standards, and looks likely to remain that way in the near-term, it could also escalate unexpectedly as Norway experienced.

Furthermore, there is no current evidence that these powers have been misused. While several injustices have resulted from counter-terrorist action in Australia (see Izhar ul-Haque and Dr. Mohamed Haneef for starters), none are known to have resulted from ASIO’s coercive questioning powers.

Of course, there is not much information to base a judgement on one way or the other. Fortunately, there are currently two independent inquiries examining the appropriateness and effectiveness of Australia’s counter-terrorism laws. There is no doubt that these inquiries will be independent; one is led by former judge Anthony Whealy (who oversaw Sydney Pendennis trial) and the other is led by Bret Walker, who not long ago was a defence lawyer for an accused terrorist. These inquiries will not be shams.

If there is evidence that ASIO’s coercive questioning powers have been used unjustly, hopefully these inquiries will uncover it (and if so, the case for removing these powers will be far stronger than it currently is). For example, there have been persistent claims about ASIO officers inappropriately forcing compliance by threatening to use these powers. Hopefully these inquiries will also reveal whether these powers have in fact helped prevent attacks, so that we no longer have to rely on informed guesswork.

The Age ran an interview today with Abdul Rahman Ayub, a former leader of Jemaah Islamiyah’s Australian branch. As JI’s activities in Australia are not widely-known, here is a short history of how its Australian presence developed, in the context of JI’s own formation and its split from an earlier movement, Darul Islam.

This history has been compiled from notes I had been making for a paper a few months ago, before deciding to focus the paper on a different topic.  I would be keen to hear feedback from JI watchers.

This post largely covers up to 1999 and does not go into detail on the Jack Roche plot and how some JI factions decided to support al-Qaeda’s global terror campaign, which I may address in a follow-up post. Sources have been placed at the bottom.

The global jihadist movement received some support from within Australia during the 1990s, but on a much smaller scale than in Europe. The Australian connections were primarily through small and informal networks which enabled some individuals to train or fight overseas, mainly in Pakistan with Lashkar e-Toiba and in Afghanistan with Al Qaeda.

The most significant formal network in Australia was Mantiqi IV, which resulted in the country’s first planned act of jihadist terrorism, the Jack Roche plot. Mantiqi IV was the local branch of Jemaah Islamiyah, a jihadist organisation based throughout Southeast Asia that had the chief goal of establishing an Islamic State in Indonesia.

Jemaah Islamiyah’s origins lie in Darul Islam, an Islamist movement that waged an insurgency against the Republic of Indonesia until 1962. The Sukarno regime defeated the rebellion and captured, tried and executed its leader, Sekarmadji Karidjan Kartosoewirjo. The Suharto regime, which took power in 1966, continued to suppress Darul Islam. However, attempts by the intelligence organisation Opsus to revive and control this underground movement, in order to manipulate the 1971 election, created a window of opportunity. Darul Islam took advantage, re-gained a national base and re-asserted its challenge to the state through both political activity and violent action.

The movement developed a territorial command structure that mirrored that of the Indonesian army. Its members conceived themselves as belonging to an already existing Islamic State (albeit one that needed to be defended from a secular regime) the Negara Islam Indonesia (NII) declared by Kartosoewirjo  in 1949. Among its members were Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Baku Bashir, who would later establish JI.

Sugnkar and Bashir joined Darul Islam in 1976, and had been Islamist preachers with a significant following in their own right. They ran a school known as Pondok Ngruki, and operated an anti-government radio station until it was shut down in 1975. Their approach to creating an Islamic State differed from that of Darul Islam as a whole, foreshadowing the eventual split. The two preachers were influenced by international Islamist writers such as al-Maududi and Hasan al-Banna, founder of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and had a Middle Eastern-influenced and puritanical understanding of Islam. By contrast, Darul Islam’s understanding of Islam, while absolutist, was heterodox in that it contained Sufi elements and local folk traditions.

More significant were strategic differences. The two preachers adopted a new approach to undermining the state after being arrested in 1978 then released in 1982. Sungkar and Bashir became key figures in the Usroh movement, which was an attempt by at least two factions of Darul Islam to build a new base of support by creating small, interlinked study circles, which was an organisational concept derived from the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. This was more sophisticated, and less overtly confrontational, than Darul Islam’s strategy of creating a shadow government. Sungkar and Bashir also sought further international linkages. During this time, their first connections to Australia developed.

The first key connection resulted from an Australian woman who converted to Islam, Rabiyah Hutchinson, becaming an enthusiastic participant in the Usroh movement. In early 1984, Hutchinson met Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Baku Bashir, worked for a period at their school, Pondok Ngruki, and then travelled to Jakarta and joined one of their Usroh groups. There she met a Darul Islam follower Abdul Rahim Ayub (it was his brother, Abdul Rahman Ayub, who featured in The Age today). Ayub was critical of Sungker and Bashir for deviating from the broader movement, but after Hutchinson introduced Ayub to the two clerics during a trip to Ngruki, he became a loyal disciple.

However, her travels coincided with the Suharto regime’s renewed repression of Islamist opposition. The Indonesian military opened fire on protesters at Tanjung Priok, north of Jakarta, and the authorities detained and tortured several Usroh members. Hutchinson went into hiding with Ayub. The two returned to Ngruki in early 1985 and married each other, with Sungkar officiating. This year was a turning point for Sungkar’s DI faction, and when Indonesia’s Supreme Court ruled that Sungkar and Bashir should be re-imprisoned, they fled to Malaysia with many of their followers. It was also not safe for Hutchinson and Ayub, so they came to live in Australia, where Abdul Rahim Ayub would later be asked by Sungkar to continue their struggle.

Indonesia’s suppression of Islamism in the 1980s resulted in many activists fleeing to other countries. Many more than Abdul Rahim Ayub fled to Australia, though none would later prove to be as central to JI. One person who fled Indonesia after the Tanjung Priok massacre was Zainal Arifan, who was a religious teacher and acquaintance of Abdul Rahim Ayub, and would later prove to be an obstacle to Mantiqi IV.

From Malaysia, Sungkar and Bashir arranged for many of their followers to fight and train with the anti-Soviet mujahideen in Afghanistan. Several of their followers fought with Osama bin Ladin in the Battle of Jaji, and trained with international jihadists in camps in Pakistan, which set the stage for the al-Qaeda-JI relationship that existed in the 1990s.

By this point, differences between Sungkar’s faction and the rest of Darul Islam were becoming clearer. Structurally, Sungkar had established international connections well beyond those of any other DI leader. Strategically, his faction eschewed DI’s unsuccessful overt method of attempting to re-establish an Islamic State, its territorial command model, and did not yet engage in violence in Indonesia, instead making a considered effort to acquire arms, training and experience in anticipation of a coming war. They also understood that the NII did not in any realistic sense exist, because it did not control territory, and hence saw the need for safe-havens in external countries. Sungkar and Bashir used their Malaysian exile to travel widely and build support for their movement, including in Australia.

On April 1990, Hutchinson and Ayub hosted Sungkar and Bashir on their first visit to Australia. They travelled throughout Melbourne and had minor celebrity status among some members of the Indonesian Diaspora as victims of Suharto.

Hutchinson divorced Ayub that year and she left for Pakistan. From this point on Ayub would be responsible for Sungkar and Bashir’s many visits. On January 1991 Ayub contacted Zainal Arifin in Sydney, whom he had not seen in years, and secured his agreement to host the preachers’ next trip. Following a meeting in Sydney, they agreed to form “Darul Islam in exile”, with Abdul Rahim Ayub as head, and under the overall command of Sungkar and Bashir. They raised an estimated $15,000 a year, at this stage the money was given on the basis of opposition to Suharto, and not for terrorist activity (which JI did not engage in until the turn of the century).

Ayub struggled to build a large following, particularly as Zainal Arifin came to leave the movement, along with ten others, refusing to take orders from Sungkar. Ayub then had to move to Sydney look after the small number of Darul Islam followers remaining.

Sungkar and Bashir officially broke away from Darul Islam on January 1, 1993, and declared the establishment of Jemaah Islamiyah. The JI guidelines were delivered to Ayub and he was instructed to lead the group secretly, not mentioning its existence to outsiders. Sungkar and Bashir argued to their Australian supporters that Darul Islam’s lack of territory showed the need to form a new group, with one follower recalling, “Bashir said that to be Darul Islam you need to have a place, some land, but they didn’t have a place or any land, so the view was that the group shouldn’t be named as a state any more but should just be named group or community.”

JI operated along a territorially-based command structure, but unlike Darul Islam, it was more covert and extended across Southeast Asia. By 1997, four such territorially-based commands were established, called Mantiqis. Mantiqi I covered Singapore and Malaysia, Mantiqi II covered most of Indonesia, and Mantiqi III covered Mindanao, Sabah and Sulawesi (in the Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia respectively). Mantiqi IV covered Australia and Papua.

Mantiqi IV’s primary responsibility was fundraising, and Australia was a very low priority for JI. Sidney Jones stated that Mantqi IV was initially intended to be established in Sulawesi, which “implies a mantiqi in Australia was never really a going concern”.  Nasir Abas, who was head of Mantiqi III and later cooperated with authorities, wrote that the Australian branch was never actually a Mantiqi and was not called Mantiqi IV. He states that it was actually called Mantiqi Ukhra, which translates as “another Mantiqi incomplete”, which both suggests Australia’s low importance to the movement and accurately describes its lack of success.

The branch was in many ways a failure, which their unsuccessful attempt to take over administration of a new Mosque being built in Sydney demonstrated. Zainal Arifin was the main imam for the Mosque, but Abdul Rahim Ayub attempted to have his brother, the jihadist veteran Abdul Rahman Ayub (who entered Australia in 1997 and sought refugee status), installed as imam instead. The result was a confrontation that ended with Arifin taking out Apprehended Violence Orders against the Ayub twins. Some Mantiqi IV members remained in Sydney, while others including the Ayubs moved to Perth and tried to recruit Islamic converts and Indonesian students.

Mantiqi IV were widely regarded as the “weak link” in JI. They expended much effort and money on keeping Abdul Rahman Ayub in Australia (he was denied refugee status and faced deportation) and on trying to keep control of the Mantiqi, as the Melbourne and Sydney based members had begun sending money directly to Bashir rather than through the Ayubs. The Mantiqi was always small –ASIO estimated that Mantiqi IV had 30 members and possibly 100 supporters across three States (Abdul Rahman Ayub states similar figures in The Age today) – and relatively dysfunctional. In 1998 JI dispatched Asman Hashim, a veteran of jihad in Mindanao, to Australia to professionalise the branch.

However, the Mantiqi’s presence did result in Australia’s first jihadist plot, because of al-Qaeda’s successful co-optation of a segment of JI through individuals such as Hambali. In 2000 Mantiqi IV member Jack Roche travelled to Afghanistan to fight with the Taliban (Hambili facilitated the trip and was his main point of contact). While there he was asked by senior Al-Qaeda leaders to do reconnaissance for attacks intended to take place during the Sydney Olympics. The targets were the Israeli embassy in Canberra, the Israeli consulate in Sydney, a prominent Jewish businessman in Melbourne. Mantiqi Four was largely unsupportive of the plot (though there are different versions of what happened and the truth isn’t clear) and the Ayubs felt their authority was being undercut, which helped the plot to fail. It’s fortunate that the plot fell apart by itself, as Australian authorities were unaware of it until after the 2002 Bali bombings.

Following the Bali bombings, homes of suspected Mantiqi IV members were raided in Sydney, Melbourne and Perth. Roche was charged over the 2000 bombing plot, and pleaded guilty.

Sources:

Abas, Nasir (2005) Unveiling Jamaah Islamiyah: Confessions of an Ex-JI Member, Jakarta: Grafindo Khazanah Ilmu. (Written in Bahasa Indonesian, I read a later English translation which I can’t find a link for online) Update 1: In the comments Jack Roche has provided a translation, available here.

Chulov, Martin (2006) Australian Jihad: The Battle Against Terrorism From Within and Without, Sydney: Pan Macmillan.

Fealy, Greg and Borgu, Aldo (2005) Local Jihad: Radical Islam and terrorism in Indonesia, Australian Strategic Policy Institute.

Jones, Sidney (2004) Indonesia Backgrounder: Jihad in Central Sulawesi, ICG Asia Report No. 74, Brussels and Jakarta, 3 February.

Jones, Sidney (2010) “ New Order Repression and the Birth of Jemaah Islamiyah” in Soeharto’s New Order and Its Legacy , Canberra: ANU E Press.

Michaelson, Christopher (2005) “Antiterrorism Legislation in Australia: A Proportionate Response to the Terrorist Threat?”, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism vol. 28, iss. 4, pp. 321-339.

Neighbour, Sally (2004) In the Shadow of the Swords: On the Trail of Terrorism From Afghanistan to Australia, Sydney: HarperCollinsPublishers.

Neighbour, Sally (2009) The Mother of Mohammed: An Australian Woman’s Extraordinary Journey into Jihad, Melbourne: Melbourne University Press.

Temby, Quinton (2010) “Imagining an Islamic State in Indonesia: From Darul Islam to Jemaah Islamiyah”, Indonesia, Volume 89 (April).

R v Roche [2005] WASCA 4 (14 January 2005)

I was recently asked whether the newly announced Council of Australian Governments review of counter-terrorism laws, and the inquiry that resulted in Anonymous attacks on ASIO and DSD websites, were the same thing. They aren’t, but the three different national security inquiries currently happening can be easily confused.

As we don’t have the simplest security bureaucracy in the world, this post explains what inquiries are occurring right now, what they are about, and how to contribute.

The one getting the most coverage is the “Inquiry into potential reforms of National Security Legislation” being carried out by the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security.

The inquiry will examine potential changes to the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979, the Telecommunications Act 1997, the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 and the Intelligence Services Act 2001 (which covers intelligence services other than ASIO, such as ASIS).

The most important thing to read on it is the Discussion Paper, which details the proposals and presents some arguments in favour of them.

As it’s a discussion paper, there is no reason to believe the government plans to go ahead with every proposal in it. The paper divides the proposals into categories A, B and C, in descending order of priority. Category A is “those the Government wishes to progress”, category B contains “those the Government is considering progressing” and category C contains “those on which the Government is expressly seeking the views of the PJCIS”.

The data retention proposal, which has caused the most controversy, is in category C. This is the proposal that motivated #OpAustralia, where Anonymous tried to bring down the ASIO and DSD websites and steal private citizen’s data from AAPT. As many have pointed out, this is an incredibly stupid way to convince people we don’t need extra security powers. Political campaigns like GetUp’s, or well-argued submissions to the inquiry, will prove far more effective.

The inquiry is open to public submissions until 20 August 2012.

Another inquiry in the news is a review of counter-terrorism laws being carried out for the Council of Australian Governments. It was announced on Thursday, though it was originally scheduled for 2010.

The Hon. Anthony Whealy QC, will conduct the review. As a judge he presided over the trial of five members of the Sydney Pendennis cell, who were all convicted of serious terrorism offences. He was also the judge for the trial of Faheem Lodhi, who had taken part in a Lashkar e-Toiba guided terrorist plot in 2003. Whealy has also written the papers “Difficulty in obtaining a fair trial in terrorism cases” (paywalled) and “Terrorism and the right to a fair trial“.

The inquiry is open to public submissions until 1 November 2012.

There is also another inquiry, but this one has not been in the news at all. The Independent National Security Legislation Monitor (INSLM) is conducting his regular annual review.

The current INSLM is Bret Walker, and his job is to examine whether current counter-terrorism laws are effective and justified. His new review will be given to the Prime Minister at an undetermined point before 31 December 2012, and will probably become public some months after. This review will have a particular focus on ASIO powers (questioning and detention), control orders, and preventative detention. I recommend reading the INSLM’s last annual report (which was also his first).

The inquiry is open to public submissions until 10 September 2012.

Why do we have all these inquiries? Largely because national security policy making changed after the end of the Howard government.

A recent journal article by Professor George Williams also made this point: “The change of federal government in late 2007 marked a shift in how Australia’s anti-terror laws have been made. Few new laws have since been enacted and those that have been have involved a more satisfactory process.”

This happened partly because Rudd and Gillard simply had a different approach, partly because their political position was not as strong (compared to when the Coalition controlled both Houses after 2004), and partly because the sense of urgency following attacks like 9/11, Bali, Madrid and London has vanished.

So we currently have a better national security policy process, demonstrated by one public inquiry examining proposed new laws well before they are enacted, and two public inquiries examining whether current counter-terrorism laws are effective and justified.

Tom Hyland, International Editor for the Sunday Age, kindly sent the following email in response to Wednesday’s post Resources: Australian Counter-insurgency in Afghanistan. It is posted here with permission, edited slightly to present the links in the same format as the original post.

I’ve just come across your excellent list of resources on Australia and Afghanistan.

The lack of information here contrasts with what’s available from the Netherlands and which helps put Australia’s role in perspective.

There’s this:
3D ‘The next generation’. Lessons learned from Uruzgan for future operations
Netherlands Institute of International Relations
December 2011

This has excellent background, and highlights the early tension between the Dutch, Australians and US:
Mission Uruzgan: collaborating in multiple coalitions for Afghanistan
Amsterdam University Press
June 2012

An earlier TLO report is also useful:
The Dutch engagement in Uruzgan – TLO report 2010
The Liaison Office
May 2010

Here in Melbourne, Richard Tanter did great work setting this up:
Australia in Afghanistan: quick guide
The Nautilus Institute
October 2010

And forgive my journalistic preciousness, but Lateline’s report on the TLO/AusAID issue was an old story (worth re-telling nonetheless).

You read it here first:
Taliban far from defeated in Australian zone: report
April 22, 2012

And again here:
Independent analysis of Oruzgan mission axed
May 27, 2012

As for why there’s a paucity of reporting here, people in my business usually blame military and government obstruction – a valid complaint, up to a point.

The other side of the story is that editors, based on what they assume to be readers’ interests, are just not interested in the story.

Today the Shanghai Daily reported that two terror suspects, an Australian and a Tanzanian, have been arrested in Kenya.

The article raises a possible al-Shabab connection, stating that “the country’s security agencies have been on high alert after intelligence reports hinted that al-Shabab terrorists are escaping into the East African nation as the operation to rout the insurgents from Somalia gains momentum.”

If the arrests are al-Shabab linked, this will be the first allegation of an Australian becoming involved with the Somali jihadist movement since 2009, when the Holsworthy Barracks plotters were arrested. Following those arrests, no evidence has appeared of new Australian connections to al-Shabab.

While the Sydney Morning Herald reported in March 2012 that ASIO still had concerns that some Australians were providing money to the group, there was no open source confirmation of this.

By contrast, claims in 2007 about Australians (mainly from a small segment of the Somali diaspora) supporting, and travelling to fight with, al-Shabab were supported by statements from some community leaders, the mother of one person involved, and later with evidence that appeared in the Holsworthy Barracks trial.

However, such support is less likely to occur now than before 2009, as the authorities have proscribed the organisation and imprisoned a key intermediary, Saney Aweys. Also, al-Shabab’s already limited popularity in the global Somali diaspora has declined in the past few years.

I’ve no idea what will come out from these recent arrests in Kenya, as there has only been one report. It could prove to be very significant, particularly as al-Shabab merged with al-Qaeda in February this year. Alternatively the two people may be innocent, they might not be linked to al-Shabab, and the article itself could simply be wrong.

If it does turn out to be new evidence of Australian involvement with al-Shabab, I suspect it will be much less extensive than what occurred between 2007 and 2009.

Update 1: More detail has appeared in The Star, a Kenyan newspaper, which reports that the man is suspected of belonging to a bomb-dealing syndicate in Kenya’s second largest city, Mombasa. Some shots were fired during the arrest, and it’s not clear if he will be taken to court. The article in The Star does not suggest any al-Shabab connection.

Update 2: Turns out the journalist Philip Dorling inquired with DFAT about this case. It’s looking doubtful that the arrested man is an Australian after all.